




this work is licensed under the creative commons 
attribution-noncommercial-noderivs 3.0 unported license. 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
printed by lightning source, milton keynes 
in an endless edition (version 120823) 
isbn 978-90-817091-6-3 
uitgeverij, den haag 
shtëpia botuese, tiranë 










This book began with a photo. 
More specifically, a picture of Saas-Fee, Switzerland. 
Friends were tagged in the image as if they were there, 
sitting in its grasses, walking up its paths. Just like they 
once had, when they had first met at egs – in the glen 
of fairies, and of writers too.
We dedicate On Blinking to those who danced up the 
mountain with us …
 … and to Lim Lee Ching & Nicole Ong.
Our friends.   

julia hölzl ·
augen, blicke, stätten Evidently in allusion to Hei-
degger’s Augenblicks-Stätte 
(“site of the moment”). Augen, 
“eyes”; Blicke, “glances”; Stätten, 
“sites.” Yet, Augenblick denotes a 
moment/instant. 
This essay, however, builds 
on some parts of my book, 
Transience: A poiesis, of dis/ap-
pearance (New York & Dresden: 




A blindness dwells in each beginning, for 
in the beginning there is darkness, no(t) 
origin: “Between origin and beginning 
[…] there are dark relations […]; between 
the two there is an interval, and even an 
uncertainty.”
A blindness dwells in each origin, for 
there is no original origin; the origin is 
to be originated, always; such is its begin-
ning. Every beginning, then, is to origi-
nate such origination, and there is no end 
to it: every beginning is a(s) beginning.
Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite 
Conversation, trans. Susan 
Hanson (Minneapolis & Lon-
don: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993), 369.
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To begin with, to begin without origin 
means nothing but this: that there could 
be such th/is. To begin is to originate what 
is yet to be said, yet to be written, yet to 
be seen (as something that could be said, 
written, seen). To begin, here, is to antici-
pate the always already pre-cipitated, is to 
pre-suppose an is, is to presume such is, is 
to originate such is as is, a th/is that could 
be seen or witnessed, is to assume that 
there could be witnesses, eyewitnesses to 
such is, that the eye would be(ar) witness 
to such (im)possibility of the(re) is.
Thence this will be, first and foremost, 
on seeing, ocular moments, momentary 
glances, glances of the eye, Augen-Blicke 




Perhaps to see is to witness, is to witness 
(the) instantaneous, momentary sites, al-
ways already en passant, always no longer.
To see is to witness, is to see the no longer, 
as it is precisely with, in this (its) passing 
that time [is], with,in these (its) moments 
that time passes. Witnessing the no long-
er, witnessing these untimely sites we are: 
it is only with,in these momentary glances 
that existence situates itself, that a there is 
opened.* There, no(t) here, never – what 
is cannot be seen. To see is to pre-vent* 
the event from eventuating, to see is to 
fore-see is to fore-tell, is to pre-dict that 
which is (to be) seen. 
See Martin Heidegger, Sein und 
Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag, 2006), 347.
Praevenire, “come before, 
anticipate, hinder”; from prae, 
“before” and venire, “to come.”
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Thence the primacy of sight. Since time 
immemorial it is the eyes that are given 
preference, at least since Parmenides: 
Come now, I will tell thee – and do 
thou hearken to my saying and carry 
it away – the only two ways of search 
that can be thought of. The first, 
namely, that It is, and that it is impos-
sible for anything not to be, is the way 
of conviction, for truth is its compan-
ion. The other, namely, that It is not, 
and that something must needs not be, 
– that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrust-
worthy path. For you cannot know 
what is not – that is impossible – nor 
utter it; For it is the same thing that 




Heidegger considers Aristotle’s famous 
beginning of the Metaphysics – namely, 
the care for seeing as being essential to 
human’s being* – to be a consequence of 
Parmenides’ τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε 
καὶ εἶναι: For it is the same thing that can 
be thought and that can be, or, as Hei-
degger puts it, being is that which is ap-
prehended, being is that which shows it-
self in such contemplative apprehending 
or perception. Only through such seeing 
is being dis-covered; original and genu-
ine truth lies in intuition, with this the-
sis remaining the foundation of Western 
philosophy. And this primacy of sight is 
equiprimordial* with the primacy of the 
present within traditional ontology*; be-
ing, seen as, seen with,in such presence, is 
thought possible only as such being-pre-
sent, a(s) being-in-this-present. Hence 
We prefer the sense of sight to 
all other senses: “Im Sein des 
Menschen liegt wesenhaft die 
Sorge des Sehens.” (Heidegger, 
Sein und Zeit, 171). See Aris-
toteles, Metaphysik: Schriften 
zur Ersten Philosophie, trans. & 
ed. Franz F. Schwarz (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 2007), 17 [980a]. For 
an English version see, for ex-
ample, The Metaphysics, trans. 
Hugh Lawson-Tancred (Lon-
don: Penguin Classics, 1999).
“Equiprimordial” is the common 
English translation for Hei-
degger’s Gleichursprünglichkeit. 
An ontology, once more, invented 
by Parmenides, who made being 
a pure being without becom-
ing. – Though admittedly also for 
Heraclitus, creator of creation, of 
being as becoming, “what eyes 
witness, ears believe on hearsay” 
Heraclitus, “Fragment 15,” Frag-
ments, trans. Brooks Hatton, 
(New York: Viking Penguin, 
2001), 11.
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the act of seeing is nothing but an asser-
tion of the present, a presenciation of the 
present as is, an assurance that the pre-
sent is a(s) present, that the present could 
be re-presented, could be seen.
What can be seen is attributed such pres-
ence: what is seen is seen as presence. To 
be in sight is to be in presence. A re-pre-
sented presence of an esse-nce, then, for 
every act of seeing implies this Wesen to 
be (present), to be seen.
The eye: an intruder, a trespasser, always 
already, distorting what [is]. It is the gaze 
which gazes after, a dividing, “a discern-
ing […]. That is to say, a fine, penetrating 
insight, a perspicacious gaze.” The gaze 
pushes itself to this fore, requires such 
fore, requires an essence, a for(e) sure.
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Elliptical 
Sense,” trans. Jonathan Der-
byshire, in Jean-Luc Nancy, A 
Finite Thinking, ed. Simon Sparks 
(Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), 107.
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And it is the – this – gaze that is to be 
abandoned, as to “dis-cern, strictly, means 
to see between [to glimpse, entrevoir], it 
is barely to see, or to guess, in an ellip-
sis of the eye. Theōrein has been reduced 
here to an extenuation, to a vestige in the 
half-light – to a twilight vision, not one 
of daytime.” 
The eye, seen as tracer, as tracing traces, 
is (to be) seen as witness, a witness of this 
half(way), and it is not only a witness, but 
is witnessing the witness itself. The eye: 
witnessing the no longer, witnessing pre-
sents that are not (present). The no longer, 
the has-been. What is this no longer, what 
is this presence, this unre-presentable 
presence that is never present, that never 
re-presents itself? And “[w]hat is a birth, 
or a death, a singular coming to presence? 
Ibid.
Jean-Luc Nancy, “A Finite 
Thinking,” trans. Edward 
Bullard, Jonathan Derbyshire 
& Simon Sparks, in Jean-Luc 
Nancy, A Finite Thinking, 30.
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How many times does this take place in 
a life? […] The event of sense, insofar as 
it is lacking, is neither the continuity of a 
substance nor the discrete rarity of an ex-
ception. It is being, the thinking of which 
is the ontological ethics of this ‘neither…
nor,’ held in strict abeyance, unsublated, 
above the abyss.”
Above the abyss, towards the abysmal a-
byssos* a ground-less in-sight, but a finite 
sight, a seeing the outside, from outside, 
and yet within, for such with,in is to re-
main abyssal.
Betweens, a trans yet no transmission. For 
what is seen cannot be transmitted, as it 
happens only once. Only once: “There’s 
not an ‘ounce’ of sense that could be ei-
ther received or transmitted: the finitude 
a, “without” and 
byssos, “bottom.”
Nancy, “A Finite 
Thinking,” 11.
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of thinking is indissociable from the sin-
gularity of ‘understanding’ what is, each 
time, a singular existence.” This finite in-
sight, always already an – its – outside, 
sees what cannot be seen (sight as such 
is impossible: how, after all, to see?), for 
what is seen becomes such seen, and is no 
longer.
Seeing is to see the appearing disappear, is 
to see appearance as such: as dis/appear-
ance.
And this seeing, this finite seeing or see-
ing (of) the finite bears witness to “the 
absence of sense as the only token of the 
presence of the existent. This presence is 
not essence, but – epekeina tēs ousias – 
birth to presence: birth and death to the 
infinite presentation of the fact that there 
Ibid., 27.
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is no ultimate sense, only a finite sense, 
finite senses, a multiplication of singu-
lar bursts of sense resting on no unity or 
substance. And the fact, too, that there is 
no established sense, no establishment, 
institution or foundation of sense, only 
a coming, and comings-to-be of sense.” 
It is only beyond (its) absence that pres-
ence [is]. Witnessing the no longer, no 
longer witnessing, the witness is “not 
present either, of course, presently pre-
sent, to what he recalls, he is not present 
to it in the mode of perception, to the ex-
tent that he bears witness, at the moment 
when he bears witness; he is no longer 
present, even if he says he is present.” 
What is witnessed, is not, is only once, is 
a once that is always already a never, and 
beyond, which is why “there is no witness 
Jacques Derrida, “Poetics 
and Politics of Witnessing,” 
trans. Outi Pasanen, in Jaques 
Derrida, Sovereignties in 
Question: The Poetics of Paul 
Celan, ed. Thomas Dutoit 
& Outi Pasanen (New York: 




for the witness.” What is [present] pre-
sents itself only once* – only one time: the 
only time. Always a first time, already. If 
seeing is witnessing, seeing is bearing wit-
ness to the impossibility (to the beyond 
of absence, of presence, that is) of such 
witness/ing. Every act of seeing is always 
already a de-scription, is to in-scribe an 
ascription, de-fining the seen.
There is no witnessing: all there is, [is] 
witnessing.
It is the presence of absence that renders 
witnessing possible, a presence that does 
not re-represent itself. There is no before 
for being: “Being absolutely does not pre-
exist; nothing preexists; only what exists 
exists.” Only what exists is, and the esse-
nce of existence consists in the withdraw-
“Only one time: circumcision 
takes place only once.” Jacques 
Derrida, “Shibboleth: For Paul 
Celan,” based on a translation 
by Joshua Wilner, revised by 
Thomas Dutoit, in Derrida, 
Sovereignties in Question, 1.
Jean-Luc Nancy, “Being Singular 
Plural,” in Jean-Luc Nancy, Be-
ing Singular Plural, ed. Werner 
Hamacher & David E. Wellbery, 
trans. Robert D. Richardson 
& Anne E. O’Bryne (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 
2000), 29.
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al of (its) existence.* The presence of the 
between lies in its absence, and it is only 
through an absense of sense that (their) 
presence is witnessed – a presence which 
“is not essence, but […] birth to presence: 
birth and death to the infinite presenta-
tion of the fact that there is no ultimate 
sense, only a finite sense, finite senses, a 
multiplication of singular bursts of sense 
resting on no unity or substance. And the 
fact, too, that there is no established sense, 
no establishment, institution or founda-
tion of sense, only a coming, and com-
ings-to-be of sense.” Once be-come, (its) 
sense is to be with-drawn; only by such 
with-drawal sense is made.*
It is the lack of significance that allows for 
the between. De-void of meaning, it is to 
be sensed. In order to be sensed, it has to 
As is the case with essence: 
Nancy, “Elliptical Sense,” 95.
Nancy, “A Finite Thinking,” 27.
As Nancy, “Elliptical Sense,” 
95, states for the essence: 
“[T]he essence of essence 
consists in the withdrawal 
of its own existence.”
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be let (gone). Thus, for the between to be 
seen as such between, a certain Gelassen-
heit is needed; bearing the either, bearing 
the or, towards the nor: neither here nor 
there. 
What is seen was (not), what is seen is still 
becoming, is becoming an absented pres-
ence, becoming an other. What is seen is 
no(t) there, is no longer. Because it was, 
the past is not (present); because it is (be-
coming present), the present is not (past). 
What is seen changes, changes us, just as 
we, changing, change the seen, the scene.*
Changing without ceasing, instantaneous, 
momentary sites present themselves 
differently, always different; presence is 
always anOther. De-signated differences: 
Or, as Henri Bergson puts it in “The 
Endurance of Life,” trans. Arthur 
Mitchell, in Henri Bergson, Key Writ-
ings, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson & John 
Mullarkey (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2005), 173: “The circum-
stances may still be the same, but they 
will act no longer on the same person, 
since they find him at a new moment 
of his history. Our personality, which 
is being built up each instant with 
its accumulated experience, changes 
without ceasing. By changing, it pre-
vents any state, although superficially 
identical with another, from ever 
repeating it in its very depth.”
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To see these momentary sites is to see 
them as and with,in signs, for what is 
seen is always already a sign, referring to 
another sign, “and only to another sign, 
ad infinitum. That is why, at the limit, one 
can forgo the notion of the sign, for what 
is retained is not principally the sign’s 
relation to a state of things it designates, 
or to an entity it signifies, but only the 
formal relation of sign to sign insofar as 
it defines a so-called signifying chain […] 
All signs are signs of signs. The question 
is not yet what a given sign signifies but 
to which other signs it refers, or which 
signs add themselves to it to form a 
network without beginning or end.” In 
sight: sighting in betweens, signing its 
signification, de-signating significance. 
Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2004), 124. 
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How to lose faith? How to loosen faith? 
How to see without sealing that which is 
seen?
One would imagine. One would imagine 
the seen to be, yet all there is [is], and it is 
an us that creates (its) presence. Evidently, 
there are no in-sights. Every act of seeing 
is to remain (an) Outside, is to remain an-
Other, external way of seeing the always 
– already – estranged.
In a blink: im-mediate eyes, glances, mo-
mentary sites. Each time unique, appear-
ances are always already dis/appearances, 
there [is] no thing but ophthalmic in-
stants, transient and ever-eluding Augen-
Blicke; and every such instant, Zarathus-
tra* reminds us, entails all things yet to 
become. An Augen-Blick, this momentary 
See Friedrich Nietzsche, Also 
sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch 
für Alle und Keinen (Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 2000), 163.
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blinking of an eye, is always already an 
inter-ference. Sub-sequently, seeing [is] 
always-already an intrusion and, there-
fore, annihilation of the former: visions 
are divisions, visions violate the veil: See-
ing [is] seeming is seeking is sealing; we 
see(k) to ascribe and we see(k) to de-fine. 
Observation is determination is violation 
of a singular(ity) yet to become; to see is 
to be-hold. Thus eidein, the act of seeing, 
has to be extricated from eidos (that which 
is seen), from an/its esse-nce (that which 
can be seen); theōrein (the act of) contem-
plation, is to be dissociated from theōrein 




transposition. The gaze is to be dis-
carded; the stare is to give way to momen-
tary looks. It is the glance that renders 
seeing possible. A glance is a genesis is 
a generation of [glances] yet to be/come. 
Yet to come: 
Interim times, embedded in Heidegger-
ian Augenblicks-Stätten, these moment-
ary sites of the between. (In-)between: 
temporary blindness, the only mode of 
seeing, the only mode of being seen. Be-
tween: blinking/s. Blinking gazes, against 
the pre-dominance of the present. It is 
only presence, but a present that is not 
present, never. What is cannot be seen: 
what is cannot be witnessed. For what is 
is not, always. It is through blinking, and 
only through blinking that one can see; 
perhaps.
26
Paroxystic restraints. Almost an almost, 




World is world, and world the image 
an earth. 
In this beginning there is a re-turn, a re-
turn to the first time which is no(t) before 
– for the origin, the origin of (the) world, 
occurs at each moment of the world,* 
and it occurs with,in a world which is 
not but which is a world that worlds.* 
To be, come, then, is to become a world. 
“Becoming everybody/everything (tout le 
monde) is to world (faire monde), to make 
a world (faire un monde).” 
Adam Staley Groves, Imaginal-
ity: Conversant and Eschaton 
(New York: Atropos Press, 
2009), 20.
Nancy, “Being Singular Plural,” 83.
“Welt ist nie, sondern weltet.” 
Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des 
Grundes (Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torio Klostermann, 1995), 44.
Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, 308. 
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Faire (un) monde: faire (une) vision (d’un 
monde).
In, between these ex-positions some be-
tweens, between these over-exposures 
some per-spectives,* claiming the pass-
ing (through),* passing through these 
worlds, imagined worlds. It is always a 
passing through, a(s) passing the passage.
The image, a world. The world, an image; 
made such image, imagining its imagina-
tion.
And it is the photograph that is meant to 
transmit such worlds, “the scene itself, the 
literal reality,” that is; or at least its perfect 
analogon. Yet, the scene itself – a sign, a-
signing its reality once more, always once 
more – evades its re-production: all that 
Perspicere, “inspect, look through”; 
from per, “through” and specere, 
“look at.”
“Denn jede Per-spektive nimmt 
schon das Durchgängige für ihre 
Blickbahn in Anspruch.” (Martin 
Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie 
[Vom Ereignis], Gesamtausgabe 65, 
ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Her-
rmann [Frankfurt am Main: Vit-
torio Klostermann, 1989], 447.)
Roland Barthes, “The Photo-
graphic Message,” in Image 
Music Text, trans. Stephen 
Heath (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1978), 17.
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[is] [was] (no image). What we see (as im-
age) has not been, what we see (as image) 
has been made (an image). And there is 
no world outside the image; a photograph 
is an image of concepts, as Flusser eluci-
dates.*
The photograph is thought to bear witness 
of and to the witness. A double binding, a 
referent without reference. The image wit-
nesses what cannot be witnessed. Witness 
of the no longer, the image tries to see: 
trying to see an outside that is with,in, 
trying to see the event whilst eventuating 
it, event-ually eventuating itself, for it is 
the image that event-uates (the event). A 
photograph names the no longer (names 
it a no longer), the photograph remains 
and re-names the no longer (re-names 
it a/s no longer). It turns a blind eye to 
Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography, trans. Anthony Mathews 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 36.
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blinking, blinks the fact that nothing is 
given at once; everything is given at once, 
given only once. Only once, in the blink 
of an eye, a blink of an eye. 
What is, here, then, in this blink of an eye, 
is curiosity, which, following Heidegger, is 
not limited to seeing.* Rather, it expresses 
a tendency to an encounter, to a being-
encountered, a letting-be of such an en-
counter. Curiosity takes care to see not 
in order to understand what it sees, but 
only in order to see,* and it might thus 
able to let the seen be: let the seen dis/
appear. No(t) Neu-Gier, no voracity for 
the new, but for an Other. To look at the 
Other in her Otherness is to re-spect* an 
Other/ness already given, the only pres-
ence there is, above the abyss. Sur-mount-
ing the sense of sight, opening a passage 
Respicere, “look back at, 
regard, consider”; from re, 
“back” and specere.
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 170.
Ibid., 172.
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towards the sensing of senses, the sense of 
sensing – an opening towards touching, 
for “[s]ense is touching. The ‘transcen-
dental’ of sense (or what is ‘ontological’ in 
it) is touch: obscure, impure, untouchable 
touch.” A touching the singular, a singular 
touch, touched for the very first time* – 
“To touch oneself, to be touched right at 
oneself, outside oneself, without anything 
being appropriated. That is writing, love, 
and sense.” 
That is curiosity, again, a new, always a 
new; to see not to understand but to see, 
as seeing is only possible when eluding its 
appropriation, its sense. To see between, 
to see between these traces, between these 
traces that are, that are by tracing traces. 
For seeing is tracing, and “to discern is to 
see and to trace; it is to see or to trace at 
Nancy, “Elliptical Sense,” 109.
Nancy, “Elliptical Sense,” 110.
Like a Virgin, like Madonna’s Virgin.
Ibid.
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the point where the rings around the eyes 
touch – between the eyes. Discerning is 
where touching and vision touch. It is the 
limit of vision – and the limit of touch. To 
discern is to see what differs in touching. 
To see the center differing (from itself): 
the ellipsis.”
To see is, perhaps, to discern what differs.
33
IV
We, then, here, in the end, in this end, in 
this origin of the end, “‘have discerned’: 
we have divided off with a cerne, which 
in French is the contour and particularly 
the ring of fatigue around tired eyes; thus 
we have divided off from two cernes, trac-
ing the contour and the division, the di-
vision as contour […]. We have retraced 
the limit of writing, writing as limit. We 
haven written writing: it can’t be seen, or 
barely; it writes itself; it traces itself and 
effaces itself under the very eyes of anyone 
who would try to look.”
Nancy, “Elliptical Sense,” 107.
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We, here, in this end, have reached no 
end, have not come to an end. For there 
is no here for the now. Here we, still, try to 
look, try to look at the written, try, then, 
after all, to look at the poem, taking “its 
position at the edge of itself; in order to 
be able to exist, it without interruption 
calls and fetches itself from its now-no-
longer back into its as-always […] The 
poem wants to reach the Other, it needs 
this Other, it needs a vis-à-vis. It searches 
out and addresses it. Each thing, each per-
son is a form of the Other for the poem, 
as it makes for this Other.” To make for 
anOther: to see the no more to be named. 
To make for an ending, within which we 
dis-cern, within which we bear witness to 
the impossibility of naming, of witnessing 
– of seeing, after all.
Paul Celan, “The Meridian” 
(Georg Büchner prize speech, 
1960), trans. Jerry Glenn, in 
Jacques Derrida, Sovereignties 
in Question, 181.
35
Stunden, maifarben, kühl. 





steht nicht mehr im Wege, die Wimper 
zählt nicht, was eintritt
Die Träne, halb, 
die schärfere Linse, beweglich, 
holt dir die Bilder. 
 
7
Paul Celan, “Ein Auge, offen/
An eye, open,” in Selected Poems, 
trans. Michael Hamburger (Lon-
don: Penguin Books, 1996), 136ff.
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Hours, May-coloured, cool. 
The no more to be named, hot, 
audible in the mouth.
No one’s voice, again.
Aching depth of the eyeball: 
the lid 
does not stand in its way, the lash 
does not count what goes in.
The tear, half, 
the sharper lens, movable,
brings the image home to you.
It is always a(t) first glance that there is.
jeremy fernando ·
at the risk of love or,  
on reading & touching in 3 ½ blinks
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What happens when one reads?
That is the question that we will be attempting to address. And 
once the dossier of reading is opened, the question of what 
is it that one is reading?, that is, what is the object of reading, 
is never far behind. Since there is an object, one must also 
take into account the question of the objective of reading – of 
not only whether there is an aim, but also whether this aim is 
reached, whether it can be reached, which opens the notion of 
calculability, accountability, accounting. And one should not 
be mistaken: one will always be held accountable. 
Who ever said that reading was safe. 
As Paul de Man has taught us, “not that the act of reading 
is innocent, far from it. It is the starting point of all evil”1 – 
“evil” in the precise sense of the question, questioning, heresy. 
For, we should not forget that reading begins by opening the 
question: one can even posit that all questions bear echoes of 
the primordial question, “did God really ask you not to eat 
from any of the trees in the garden?”2 This is not the time nor 
place to open the dossier on performative truths, lies, and the 
divine – what is crucial to us is that this is a question that is 
never answered, a question that remains a question. Hence, 
even as we open questions in relation to reading, we should 
1 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Rilke, Nietzsche, and 
Proust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), 194.
2 Genesis 3:1. All references to the Bible are taken from the Jerusalem Bible.
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bear in mind that the status of a question is always itself called 
into question, questionable. 
Perhaps we should slow down a little, and begin once again 
at the beginning. And reopen the question we started with: the 
question of the relationality between oneself and a text. This is 
a question not only of hermeneutics, but also one of phenom-
enology; for, the question of what a text means can only come 
about at, if not after, the moment one is engaging a text. Thus, 
reading is the relationality between the subject and the object, 
but one that never allows the two to be separated, or defined. 
When one reads, the subject calls the object into being but, at 
the same time, the subject is only a subject as such because of 
its relation to that very object. Hence, this is a relationality in 
which both the subject and object can be known in relation 
with each other, but whose status as such is always already in 
question. After all, the reader and the text (s)he is reading is 
brought into the relationality, and also separated, by reading. 
An act that cannot itself be without the very relation it brings 
about. Hence, it is both the name of the relationality and also 
the condition of the relation it names. As such, it names noth-
ing other than the fact that relationality is the non-essence 
of the relation between two things. At best: a space between.
Here, if we pay attention, it is not too difficult to pick up 
echoes of Lucretius’ conception of communication, where the 
communion occurs in the skin – the simulacra – between the 
two parties in a relationality.3 And if communication happens 
whilst it is happening, the implication is that each occurrence 
3 Lucretius, The Nature of Things, trans. A.E. Smallings (London: Penguin Classics, 2007), 
106–47.
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is singular. In this manner, it is akin to the emergent property 
of a chemical reaction: even though one can guess to a great 
extent what will materialize each time two elements come 
into contact with each other, there is still never a guarantee. 
Strictly speaking, the emergent property is unknowable, re-
mains veiled from us, until the moment it emerges. In terms of 
communication, the notion of mis-communication would be 
a misnomer: for, that would only be possible with an a priori 
knowledge of the outcome. Without such a preconceived no-
tion, any – and every – outcome is possible. Thus, even the 
notion of an unintended outcome is itself questionable. So, 
even as previous outcomes provide a certain probability, there 
is always already the potentiality of an unknown – and perhaps 
always unknowable – element in every communion. 
In terms of knowing, this opens the question of the rela-
tionality between memory and knowledge. Since knowledge 
is premised on correspondence, this suggests that it is an act 
of memory. And here, we should open our receptors to the 
tropes of habit and habitus: for, it is through repetition that 
we learn, that something becomes habitual, that it is known to 
us. At that point, that habit becomes a part of us, inhabits us. 
Perhaps even to the point where we can no longer separate it 
from us, it can no longer be apart from us. After all, we often 
say that one knows something when one no longer has to think 
of it – when one can do it instinctively. When one has forgotten 
that one even knows it. However, one must also consider the 
fact that one has no control over forgetting – it can happen to 
one at any time. To compound matters, there is no object to 
forgetting: the moment the object is known – the moment one 
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can name what one has forgotten – one is back in the realm of 
memory. At best, one might be able to state the name of what 
one has forgotten (I have forgotten how to do trigonometry) 
but it would be a name without referentiality, without cor-
respondence – a floating signifier, a pure name; a catachrestic 
metaphor – it could be anything, everything, and nothing, at 
exactly the same time. As such, there is no way in which to 
know if forgetting happens – and thus, each act of memory 
might well have forgetting in it. In this sense, there is no actual 
way of distinguishing between truly knowing – where one is 
inhabited by the habit – and not knowing at all.
If this were not so, one would not be able to say: “I don’t 
know.”
Each time one utters, “I don’t know,” one calls referentiality 
into question. For, if there was a referent to the statement, then 
one cannot truly not know. Of course, one can then posit that 
“I don’t know” is a performative statement: whilst this might 
be true, one can never be sure of its status as performative; 
that would presume once again that there was a constative ver-
sion, variation, as well. And if that were true, one would then 
have to claim that “I don’t know” was a lie. Whilst this again 
is a possibility, there is no necessity for this to be so. Which 
means that, ultimately, “I don’t know” is (n)either a constative 
(n)or a performative statement: its status is and will always be 
unknowable. Its undeterminability is due to the fact that there 
is an unknowable relation between the subject – the “I” – and 
the claim, that is, whether the “I” knows or not. This might be 
why it is possible to have an inkling that one knows something 
– one knows a something, but this something is not specified, 
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is unspecifiable. Which might be why one is able to name the 
something one has forgotten. In other words, it is possible that 
one might know a something that remains objectless: in this 
case, the statement “I know” remains an unverifiable one; a 
faith-based statement. 
However, just because (s)he is unaware of something does 
not mean that it has no effect on her: even though (s)he might 
be completely blind to it, this doesn’t mean that it cannot affect 
her. One does not have to have any knowledge of an oncoming 
bus for it to hit one. 
This suggests that at each utterance of “I don’t know,” the 
very unknowability of the object that the “I” is approaching 
might still remain completely unknowable, even as it has an 
effect on her. The implication is that even as the “I” is being 
shaped, the subject may still remain completely in the dark 
– blind. This paradoxical situation is captured beautifully in 
Werner Hamacher’s deceptively simple formulation, “under-
standing is in want of understanding.”4 This is not a “want” in 
terms of a lack – where there is a shortfall in understanding. 
This is not even just an understanding that brings with it the 
potential of un-understanding, where un-understanding is a 
part of all understanding. This is an “understanding” that is 
inseparable from a “want of understanding” itself: where what 
is usually – keeping in mind that usually is of the order of habit 
– considered antonyms are different and yet un-differentiable 
at the same time. 
4 Werner Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan, 
trans. Peter Fenves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1.
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So, even as we posit the importance of habits, each encoun-
ter with a habit is always already fraught with the impossibil-
ity of differentiating habit as repetition from the singularity 
of each habit. Each time a habit comes into being, it is also in 
time – not just that it is a singular moment, but more impor-
tantly that the habit itself is being authored at that very point in 
time. And here, we should pay attention to the notion of point, 
keeping in mind Roland Barthes’ teaching that the punctum 
potentially ruptures the studium. 
So, even as it is precisely repetition – and a certain uni-
versality – which allows us to begin to address the text, to ap-
proach reading, the point of each encounter is also its potential 
breaking. 
So, even though there is a general code – grammar – in 
which language operates, the fact is that each occurrence of 
language is situational, singular. Not only is there always al-
ready a tension between universality and singularity, as Paul de 
Man continually reminds us – with reference to the relational-
ity between grammar and figurative language –, the singularity 
is the undoing of all universality itself: at each instance of an 
utterance, all grammatical universality is gone.
And it is only this potential unknowability that maintains 
communicability in its fullest sense – relationality – between 
the reader and the text; that allows each reading to be a pos-
iting, a position taken by the reader in relation with the text, 
that maintains the question in every answer, as it were. That 
resurrects the spirit in hermeneutics; where it is not so much 
a game of decoding based on a pre-set, existing, a priori code, 
but recalls that the hermeneutician is one who approaches the 
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text without ever pretending that (s)he can fully grasp it, un-
derstand by bringing under her stance. 
In order for this to be so, we have to think of reading as 
an attempt to respond to the call of the text. Keeping in mind 
that the call can only come about as a result of that very act of 
reading itself. These were the very notions that Saint Augustine 
was meditating on in Confessions, which begins with a series of 
questions: “how can one call for what one does not recognise? 
Without such recognition, one could be calling for something 
else. Or is calling for you the way to recognise you?”5 Is one 
called, or does one have to answer a call? More pertinently, is 
there even a call if it is not answered – which is a question of, 
is the status of a call dependent on a response? Here, we should 
keep in mind that the call Augustine was attempting to re-
spond to is of a divine nature; a call that can often be elusive, 
and even difficult. One might even go further and posit that 
responding to such a call can often be dangerous – if not for 
oneself, at least for another. The case of Abraham and Isaac 
would seem to suggest so. Even though Isaac’s killing was in-
terrupted – one can call it a divine intercession – the interven-
tion does not change the fact that his father was ready to cleft 
him in twain. In other words, this was a call of death. Or, more 
precisely, the response to the call of “Abraham, Abraham” was 
death. To be fair, one should take note of the fact that Abra-
ham did attempt to ignore Yahweh’s call: He had to call out at 
least twice. 
5 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Gary Wills (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 3.
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There is also a possibility that the first call differs from the 
second. And by responding to the latter, the murderous call, 
Abraham might well have effaced the possibility of another 
request, command even, from Yahweh. Perhaps the actual test 
was which call he would pick up. Or, one could posit – keep-
ing in mind that Yahweh is a jealous god – that the wish for a 
sacrifice was awoken precisely because He was ignored. Even 
though this can only remain in the realm of speculation, what 
remains crucial to us is the fact that the response is a part of 
the call itself.
In his meditation on calls, on callings, on being called, Wer-
ner Hamacher contends that there is a difference between lis-
tening and hearing. Not just that the former is active whilst the 
latter is potentially passive. But more importantly, in order to 
listen, one has to cease hearing: for, one can hear many things 
at the same time, but to listen – in the precise sense of attend-
ing to, responding with – one has to select one, whilst ignoring 
all other sounds, voices, things.6 
6 In Hamacher’s own words – which is a response to Peter Connor, and more specifically 
the latter’s call: “Why is the call thought of as something which, rather than taken, taken 
down, or taken in – be it from a specific agent, subject, principle, preferably a moral one – 
will be given? And if each call which issues is destined to make demands on the one who is 
called (but this is also questionable), is it already settled that I will hear, that I will hear this 
call and hear it as one destined for me? Is it not rather the case that the minimal condition 
to be able to hear something as something lies in my comprehending it neither as destined 
for me nor as somehow oriented toward someone else? Because I would not need to hear it 
in the first place if the source and destination of the call, of the call as call, were already cer-
tain and determined. Following the logic of calling up, of the call […] and along with that 
the logic of demand, of obligation, of law, no call can reach its addressee simply as itself, 
and each hearing is consummated in the realm of the possibility not so much of hearing as 
of being able to listen up by ceasing to hear. Hearing ceases. It listens to a noise, a sound, 
a call; and so hearing always ceases hearing, because it could not let itself be determined 
other than as hearing to hearing any further. Hearing ceases. Always. Listen…” (Werner 
Hamacher, “Interventions,” trans. Adam Bresnick, Qui Parle 1.2 [Spring 1987]: 38). Here, 
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And perhaps this is why “reading is the starting point of all 
evil” – to read is to choose. A choice that opens a connection 
not only to the text, or to another, but the other within the self: 
since each call only comes into being (if one can even say that 
relationality comes into being) through and with a response, 
the call itself is chosen; but in order to even be able to choose, 
one also has to assume that one is called by that call. After 
all, the call might never have been meant for one: who hasn’t 
picked up the phone on a wrong number dial. Or, even worse: 
a prank call. 
Thus, it is not just because Yahweh is beyond mortal com-
prehension that one “could be calling for something else,” but 
that there is always already something else in any call; a some-
thing that is quite possibility remains unknowable to one. 
7
Reading – touching. 
Keeping in mind that the one touching and the one being 
touched are only separated by the touch itself; a non-essence, 
as it were. 
One also must never forget Jean-Luc Nancy’s reminder 
that space is required to touch. So, even as touching brings 
one closer, in contact even, with another, one and the other 
are forever separated by the touch. In fact, it is only through 
we should not dismiss the fact that we are eavesdropping on Hamacher in a footnote, in a 
conversation that is a part of – and always also apart from – the main discourse, whatever 
that even means.  In attempting to attend to a particular notion that he opens – in listening 
– do we not also cease hearing the other possibilities opened in his response to Connor; 
enact a particular caesura? Cut off Werner Hamacher?
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maintaining the barrier, the boundary, the skin – allowing all 
echoes of Lucretius to resound here – that there is no wound-
ing, breaking, violence. Turning back to Nancy: one touches 
when there is no penetration. For, the moment skin is rup-
tured, there is an invasion – and the very space required for 
the communion is seized, effaced, ceases to be.7
Perhaps then, reading always only involves the surface. 
Which calls into question all the tropes of reading that ask us 
to dig under, to read into the text, to go below the surface. If 
reading is touching, then perhaps all one can read, all one can 
do whilst reading – in reading – is attempt to negotiate this 
surface, this border; at the risk of – perhaps only by – writing 
this very skin called reading into being. For, if reading can 
only occur in and whilst reading – and even this we remain 
unsure of – this means that in order to even call it reading, we 
have to first name it – write it into being – as such. But just 
because something is illegitimate – called into being without 
any possible verifiability; if reading is written into being as it 
occurs there is nothing beyond reading to say with certainty 
that it occurs – does not mean it is any less significant. A lack 
– perhaps even absence – of signification has no bearing on its 
ability to affect, have an effect. 
If touching is a non-essence, this boundary is also non-ex-
istent in its existence. But just because there is a gap, distance, 
does not mean that one remains safe. For, in touching, one’s 
skin is both the border and also the point of crossing. And it 
is only in crossing that the border itself is called into question. 
7 Jean-Luc Nancy explored the notions of touching, penetration, and wounding, in relation 
to love and sex during his seminar – Art, Community, and Freedom – at the European 
Graduate School, June 2007.
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Ever try crossing into another country sans papiers? With-
out first consulting the authorities? 
Without being authorised to do so?
To read – to touch – to run the risk of having authored. And 
quite possible without daddy’s permission.8
7
Reading is anguish, and this is because any text, however 
important, or amusing, or interesting it may be (and the 
more engaging it seems to be), is empty – at the bottom it 
doesn’t exist; you have to cross an abyss, and if you do not 
jump, you do not comprehend. 
– Maurice Blanchot
What you risk reveals what you value.
– Jeanette Winterson
So, why read? Why put oneself through anguish? Why do 
anything that opens oneself, renders one vulnerable? But as 
Winterson teaches us, there is value in the act of risking itself 
– it “reveals.” And since one cannot know the revelation until 
after the risk is undertaken, this is a leap of faith that has to 
be taken in all its blindness. Much like an act of initiation – a 
8 The relationality opened here between authority, authorship, and reading, owes a great 
debt to Avital Ronell – in particular Loser Sons: Politics and Authority (Illinois: University 
of Illinois Press, 2012). In her text, Ronell reminds us that authority comes from autor 
(father), and whilst attempts to assert authority might be seen as taking the place, role, of 
father, usurping his place even, it ultimately relies on – and ensures the unexorcisability of 
– daddy (even if he is a ghost). 
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rite we must pass – perhaps also a pledge of allegiance to the 
object or idea we value. For which – whom even – we are tak-
ing the risk.9
An aneconomic risk. Which perhaps only ends up reveal-
ing that one is willing to take risks. 
One should never forget that reading foregrounds fictional-
ity. Not just in terms of content but also in the relationality be-
tween the writer and what is written. One should keep in mind 
that the genre shapes one’s approach: and here, we hear echoes 
of Derrida’s reminder that each genre comes with its particular 
rules, laws, habits which shape our attempts to engage with the 
text: “you are free, but there are rules.”10 And since the reader 
only comes into being in that relation between herself and the 
text – that is in the reading – this also suggests that (s)he is 
part of this fictionality. 
So, perhaps what is most at risk is the reader herself. 
Just as “any text […] is empty – at the bottom it doesn’t ex-
ist,” every reader doesn’t exist except in what is called, named, 
reading. But even as we say that, Blanchot warns us again that 
one only has to name due to the very absence of what is being 
named: “I say a flower! But in the absence where I mention 
it, through the oblivion to which I relegate the image it gives 
me, in the depths of this heavy word, itself looming up like an 
unknown thing, I passionately summon the darkness of this 
9 The question of the risk in, and of, reading was opened to me in a conversation with 
Esther Ng Xinlin at the English Department of Nanyang Technological University, Singa-
pore, October 2010. Ng has pursued the same question in an unpublished essay entitled 
“The Question of Reading: What was Lost?” where she posits that reading itself brings our 
notions of reality into question.  
10 Jacques Derrida, Right of Inspection, trans. David Wills (New York: The Monacelli Press, 
1998), n.p. 
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flower, I summon this perfume that passes through me though 
I do not breathe it, this dust that impregnates me though I do 
not see it, this color which is a trace and not light.”11 In nam-
ing, what is called, summoned is precisely the “darkness” – that 
which is non-phenomenal. In naming the relationality read-
ing, what is being summoned is the non-phenomenality of 
reading.
For, if reading is the name for an openness to the possibility 
of an encounter, this encounter cannot be constituted before its 
encounter. Hence, each encounter must remain unknowable 
until the encounter. And if every encounter is singular, each 
encounter might well be other to every other encounter. Thus, 
an encounter always already potentially undoes all encounters: 
which suggests that even after the encounter, the very know-
ability of the encounter remains in question. 
Each reading is quite possibly the undoing of every read-
ing – of reading itself. 
It is “an abyss, and if you do not jump, you do not compre-
hend.” But even jumping offers no guarantee of comprehen-
sion. All one potentially does is cross the abyss – the text itself 
remains far beneath, below, beyond, one. At the point of jump-
ing, all one can know is that one is jumping. 
But then, the question remains: what is the value? Or, how 
does one valuate what one values? More pertinently, can one 
ever evaluate a risk, particularly one which is singular, where 
all the entities involved – the reader, the reading, and what is 
being read – all come into being only in the encounter. 
11 Maurice Blanchot, The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 327.
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Thus, is the very revelation the fact that what is valued is 
risk itself? 
7
This then leaves us in a bit of a quandary: if reading only oc-
curs at the point of reading, it is an event. And as such, one 
cannot know of it until it happens. Which means that strictly 
speaking we can say nothing about reading, and only attend to 
its effects. Which is the implication of the question we opened 
with: what happens when one reads? At this point though, tak-
ing into consideration that the reader only comes into being 
at the point of reading, the question begins to take on strange 
inflections. For, if the one that is reading is dependent on the 
reading, then it cannot be solely a question of effects: that 
would require a stable notion of a one prior to reading. Of 
course, the subject that encounters reading comes before the 
reading occurs: however, if we are considering the notion of 
reading as an event, the subject that emerges from the encoun-
ter might well be altered in ways beyond the cognition of the 
subject. As Alain Badiou teaches us, the evental moment is the 
point where there is the opening of a “new world within an old 
world”: phenomenally, the world might remain the same, but 
is altered, just ever so slightly; perhaps in ways that continue 
to escape the one(s) affected. And since the one(s) potentially 
remain blind to these possible changes, one can never fully 
know if they have occurred. Moreover, if there is no necessary 
phenomenality to these changes, not only are the subjects in-
volved blind to them, the changes themselves – the cause, as 
53
it were, of the changes – potentially remain unknown. In this 
sense, there is a double blindness: both of the subject and the 
object in question. Thus, the very status of the event itself is 
always already questionable. Not only is the question of what 
happens to one potentially unknowable, not only is the one 
possibly veiled, the very status of reading itself might well re-
main beyond us. 
Hence, the question behind, perhaps even preceding, the 
effects of reading, the question in relation to our first question, 
might well be what is reading? Here, we should keep in mind 
that fact that reading itself is a relationality, a non-essence: 
thus, the question might well be a moot one, or at least one that 
leads to nothing. Another way of putting it – risking evoca-
tions of naming, giving it another name – is that what is read-
ing itself, as a question, is a remainder, the question that is left 
– the question that remains a question. An abysmal question. 
At this point the Wittgensteinian imperative to keep si-
lent when there is nothing that can be known comes to mind. 
However, that would be a strategy of complete dismissal; 
where thinking as relationality is ignored. An effacement of 
the question itself. In order to attend to relationality, respond 
in relation to the other in the relationality without obliterat-
ing the otherness of the other, one has to respond to the other 
– gesture towards an answer as it were – whilst maintaining 
the question in every answer, every response. In other words, 
respond with a certain ironic distance; respond as if one can 
even respond.
This as if is not merely a form of David Hume’s limited 
skepticism, but a structural as if, a pre-condition of think-
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ing itself: not a suspension of disbelief so that you can believe 
in something, but more radically that in order to even begin 
thinking about something, you must act as if this thinking is 
even possible. But rather, this as if channels Samuel Beckett 
– in full acknowledgment of our inability to go on, but none-
theless heeding the call – even if this call is our own, from our 
own self – to just go on. 
One must have a notion of what one is approaching – read-
ing in this case – but neither close-off other possibilities nor 
even have a stable notion of the very idea itself. Or, in Jean-
François Lyotard’s words: “one must effectively have an Idea; 
but … this Idea is not, for us today, an Idea of totality.”12 Here, 
one should keep in mind that Lyotard is speaking as a re-
sponse, in response, in a relationality with Jean-Loup Thébaud: 
so, we have to read his response as one, as a movement that 
is affected by, and that has effects on, another. It is a singular 
response, and not an “Idea of totality.” Which might be what is 
suggested by “for us today”: the very notion itself is temporal: 
there is no guarantee that it would be the same tomorrow, or a 
moment later; it might not even be the same if it was another 
“us” that he was speaking with. So, even as one is attempting 
to think the notion of reading, one must always leave open 
the possibility of non-reading; that non-reading is a part of 
reading. For, echoing Lyotard again, “as soon as one makes a 
determinant use of the Idea, then it is necessarily the Terror.”13 
Here, one must pay attention that the Lyotard and Thébaud 
12 Jean-François Lyotard & Jean-Loup Thébaud, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad Godzich (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 88.
13 Ibid., 92.
55
have a specific notion of terror, in which “the blow is not struck 
on the adversary but it is hoped that the blow will be borne 
by the third party, the witness, public opinion. In such a case, 
everyone is caught ‘without freedom’.”14 And what else is “the 
third party, the witness, public opinion” than the skin in be-
tween, the space for negotiation. In terror, what occurs is the 
devastation of the gap required to touch, for relationality, for 
reading. But, this does not mean there is no violence involved. 
For, if reading is an opening, not only are the effects of those 
possibilities – and the manner in which they affect one – un-
known till they occur. Moreover, if each reading is a response 
to, it always already involves a choice, a choosing, of one over 
another. And since one cannot fully know what one is selecting 
until it is selected, this is a selection without Grund – an act of 
violence; picking one over all others, quite possibility without 
any legitimacy. In this sense, each time one reads, one can 
never be sure if one has mis-read, over-read, or under-read.
To compound matters, one must bear in mind the fact that 
in order to attend to reading as relationality, we have to also 
leave aside – at least momentarily – other notions of reading. 
Which means that a certain effacement always already takes 
place. Here, one must not forget that the conception of read-
ing as relationality is a particular notion of reading, accompa-
nied by its rules – in other words a game. And even as we are 
seeking to respond to the possibility of reading as an event – a 
singular justice when facing the law governing reading; gram-
mar – we have to take into account Lyotard’s question: “can 
there be then a plurality of justices? Or is the idea of justice the 
14 Ibid., 70.
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idea of a plurality? [Keeping in mind that] that is not the same 
question. I truly believe that the question we now face is that 
of a plurality, the idea of a justice that would at the same time 
be that of a plurality, and it would be a plurality of language 
games.” However, he continues, “Can there be justice without 
the domination of one game upon the others?”15 Does reading 
as response necessarily efface other notions of reading? 
This is where it might be helpful to take a little detour, turn 
to Jacques Derrida and his meditation on democracy; in par-
ticular, his reminder that the risk of democracy is the admis-
sion of non-democratic elements through democratic means. 
The most obvious instance of this would be the rise of the Na-
tional Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s. In this sense, 
democracy is an approach to politics rather than a totalising 
idea. As long as the process is adhered to, only after a particu-
lar party comes to power can it be judged to be democratic, or 
otherwise – but never before. Thus, if one attempts to remain 
faithful to the possibility of democracy, it can never be a pre-
scription – it can never be an “Idea” but a process, a becom-
ing, one that cannot a priori exclude any possibility, even its 
antonymic other.16 
This is perhaps why in the afterword to Just Gaming, in re-
sponse to Lyotard’s warning that “one should be on one’s guard, 
I think, against the totalitarian character of an idea of justice, 
even a pluralistic one,”17 Sam Weber notes: “if this is the case, it 
follows that the function of the great prescriber is not so much 
15 Lyotard & Thébaud, Just Gaming, 95.
16 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essay on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael 
Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005).
17 Lyotard & Thébaud, Just Gaming, 96.
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to prescribe, but rather to proscribe.”18 For, Weber continues, 
“by prescribing that no game, especially not that of prescrip-
tion, should dominate the others, one is doing exactly what is 
simultaneously claimed is being avoided: one is dominating 
the other games in order to protect them from domination.”19 
In order to protect the notion of reading as a response, para-
doxically what has to be ignored – the phone call that has to be 
shut down, disconnected – is the possibility that reading is not 
a response. However, even whilst that is being said, we must 
pay attention to Lyotard’s comment from earlier in the text: 
“boundaries are not borders… On the contrary, it is a place 
of ceaseless negotiations and ruses. Which means there is no 
reference by with to judge… [For,] we are always immanent 
to stories in the making, even when we are the ones telling the 
story to the other.”20 Thébaud’s response – “because there is 
no outside”21 – is picked up by Weber, channeling Freud and 
his reminder that “we can never be in a position that is totally 
‘immanent’ to the stories we tell because – here as elsewhere 
– the stories are not ‘immanent’ to themselves.”22 Thus, even 
as we have to temporarily ignore the possibility of reading as 
non-response, we cannot ever completely shut it out: for, we 
can only judge after the reading has occurred whether it is a 
response or not. But then, through the very same means, non-
response might well have snuck in through the door. 
18 Samuel Weber, “Afterword – Literature: Just Making It,” in Lyotard & Thébaud, Just 
Gaming, 104.
19 Ibid., 105.
20 Lyotard & Thébaud, Just Gaming, 43.
21 Ibid.
22 Weber, “Afterword,” 111.
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And even as we are learning from Sam Weber and his re-
sponse, we must never forget that we are reading Weber’s read-
ing of Lyotard and Thébaud. Whilst keeping in mind Weber’s 
lesson that “interpretation, like narration, is not simply exter-
nal to the dream, it is an active participant in the dream itself 
(whilst still distorting it).”23 Lest one contends that this is only 
true of dreams, one should not forget that reading is reliant on 
memory, mimesis, language, narratives – all of which come 
before one, are from elsewhere, and also always re-written with 
and through one. In this sense, even as we are reading, not only 
can we not know if we are responding, we cannot even be cer-
tain if we are writing that very response that we think we are 
reading. In other words, even as we are attempting to respond, 
we can never quite be sure if we are reading. 
Thus, reading cannot be constituted even as an approach 
– for that would entail a certain knowledge about what is to 
come. At best, reading is a possibility. 
Much like love.
Particularly in the “I do.” An utterance which brings with it 
a nod to madness: a promise – keeping in mind that promises 
have no referentiality, and thus, no possibility of verification 
– where the future and the present collapse into one. For, this 
is the only way in which “when two become one” is possible: 
it could never have been about people, but about time itself: a 
promise that is made about the future, which is always in the 
past (when said, it is already over), lived out in the present. 
The “I do” as the point in which time itself is reified. A com-
ing together which is also an opening – of the relationality 
23 Weber, “Afterword,” 112.
59
between the two: a relationality that opens the possibility of 
“two becoming one” without any possibility of knowing what 
this possibility is.
The “I do” as nothing other than an affirmation to pos-
sibility. 
As Hélène Cixous might say: “I tell you yes. I begin us with 
a Yes. Yes begins us.”24 Without even – or perhaps ever – know-
ing what one is saying yes to.
Reading: the opening of the possibility where the reader 
and her text become one – not a coming together that brings 
one under another, but an opening of the possibility of a read-
ing without the possibility of knowing what reading itself is. 
Where all one can do is close one’s eyes – even as they remain 
attentive, open, searching – take the plunge, and read as if one 
can.25 As if for the first time; for each time is both the same and 
also already new. Where all one can do is to just read. 
24 Hélène Cixous, Stigmata: Escaping Texts, trans. Eric Prenowitz (London: Routledge, 
2005), 107.
25 Opened – closed – closed whilst open – only momentarily. 
Blink. 
An act that doesn’t know itself to be an act. For, it is an act insofar as it is a subject who 
blinks; but it is often also a reflex. In fact, when confronted with a blink, one can rarely 
distinguish between a cognitive act and a reflex by the other. Perhaps this is best captured 
in the colloquial saying, in the blink of an eye: in the phrase, we hear the echoes of both 
the temporality of this act, and the mystery surrounding it, as if something was seen in 
that instant, but what is seen can never be verified, can never be legitimized, and is only 
witnessed by the one who sees it, but who cannot even be sure if one has seen it. At most, 
one can speak of it – perhaps even testify to it – as if (s)he has seen it; naming the event of 
seeing, bringing with it all the possibilities of the fact that there may have been nothing to 
see, that all there was to see was something that always already is to come. When bearing 
witness to what is seen in her moment of blinking, all (s)he can do is offer a reading of it. 
All (s)he can do is offer a reading, where reading is the pre-relational relationality between 
the reader and the text; where reading is the willingness to be exposed to nothing but the 
possibility of reading; where reading is nothing but faith in the possibility of reading itself. 
Reading – blinking.
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I love you: I work at understanding you to the point of not 
understanding you, and there, standing in a wind, I don’t 
understand you. Not understanding in a way of holding 
myself in front and of letting come. Transverbal, transintel-
lectual relationship, this loving the other in submission to 
the mystery. (It’s accepting, not knowing, forefeeling, feeling 
with the heart.) I’m speaking in favour of non-recognition, 
not of mistaken cognition. I’m speaking of closeness, with-
out any familiarity. 
 – Hélène Cixous
But only in a footnote. Perhaps only to be touched – whilst jumping over.
After all, one can only fall downwards. 
Abyssal love.
jessica aliaga lavrijsen ·
suspended in a moving night: 
photography, or the shiny relation self–world 
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Que haya sueños es raro, que haya espejos,
que el usual y gastado repertorio
de cada día incluya el ilusorio
orbe profundo que urden los reflejos.
 – Jorge Luis Borges, “Los espejos”
I’ll be your mirror
Reflect what you are, in case you don’t know […]
Let me stand to show that you are blind.
 – The Velvet Underground & Nico, “I’ll Be Your Mirror”
Framed seeing – photography – shows an ambiguous nature, 
as it is window to the world, shop window for desire, and van-
ity mirror for the self. The human action in seeing, in the gaze, 
and in our desire for capturing an instant that is nevertheless 
already lost, unveils photography as a mutable surface where 
the complex relation of self–other develops. The surface, which 
separates and unites subject and object, allows a dynamic rela-
tion between realities and perceptions. It is precisely in the in-
betweenness of the ontological and epistemological break-ing, 
in the suspension “in the moving night,” that approximation 
and intimacy can take place. 
Every time somebody has tried to photograph something 
through glass – through a train window, a shop window, or 
through the protective glass of a framed painting or a photo-
graph – it becomes evident: glass is not invisibly transparent, 
and the resulting picture will not ignore the mutable reflections 
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that inhabit its surface. The resulting photograph will include 
both sides, both realities: the reality in front of the camera, as 
well as the one behind. The very nature of this transparent and 
reflective surface is double, as it allows the sight of the world, 
attaching subject and objects, and at the same time, it separates 
and duplicates, by isolating and mirroring the subject who is 
gazing. The surface works as a window to the outside and as a 
mirror to the inside, both revealing and exposing. Inevitably, 
as Borges beautifully put it, “glass is on the watch,” always.1
Because of this, we cannot ignore the surface that is in-
between, the translucent barrier/access of glass; that the pho-
tographic lens is made out of the same smooth and shiny 
material of windows and mirrors. As we shall see, the act of 
photography, like glass, involves both a distance or barrier and 
an access or relation, just as the individual feels both attached 
and detached to the image. Moreover, photography has been 
associated with the Double, as the photographic act can be un-
derstood as the coming of the self as an other.2 Photography re-
veals itself under this light as a surface where the world, desire, 
self and other, display their web of playful interconnections.
The human gaze is associated in the photographic act to 
the desire of the self towards capturing, and possessing, the 
world in an instant already lost. When looking through a shop 
window, the subject watches the framed world to be desired, 
and then, in a blink, his or her own reflection staring in on it. 
Photography is then sight–blindness, as our relation to the 
1 “nos acecha el cristal.” Translated from Jorge Luis Borges, “Los espejos,” Obra Poética 
1923/1985 (Barcelona: Emecé Editores, 1989), 125.
2 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill & Wang, 1981), 
44.
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world is discontinuous, or rather, one of presence–absence. 
Jean Baudrillard says that “[t]he world is an object that is both 
imminent and ungraspable,”3 but this could also be said for the 
subject behind the camera. Baudrillard asks: “Is photography a 
mirror which briefly captures this imaginary line of the world? 
Or is it a man who, blinded by the enlarged reflection of his 
own consciousness, falsifies visual perspectives and blurs the 
accuracy of the world?”4
We could answer his questions by suggesting that photog-
raphy is both. A photograph is a – distorted – mirror of an 
instantaneous reality that was not fully or directly experienced 
at that time, and that is infinitely recreated or re-experienced 
by the spectator – who was not there at that time, but who 
is now there, giving meaning and existence to the perceived 
resulting photograph, which is both fixed and mutable. The 
photographic act captures the world as a mirror, since it needs 
the external existing reality to become what it is. However, it 
also needs someone to give sense to its content, a spectator to 
whom the reality of the photographic act is absolutely absent 
– as he or she was not there –, and who has to recreate it in 
his or her presence, projecting him or herself into these new 
meanings that occur every time the picture is perceived.
On the glassy surface of the lens, the window and the mir-
ror, the subject and the object meet each other, merge and blur, 
and then one cannot tell whether the subject is in front of the 




glass or behind it, inside or outside. Louis MacNeice’s5 verse 
“Corner Seat” describes it thus:
Suspended in a moving night
The face in the reflected train
Looks at first sight as self-assured
As your own face 6 – But look again:
Windows between you and the world
Keep out the cold, keep out the fright;
Then why does your reflection seem
So lonely in the moving night?7
The poem expresses precisely this presence and absence im-
posed by the glass, the connection and the isolation of human 
consciousness from the world that surrounds it and from itself. 
The window protects the traveller – the individual – no doubt, 
but it also separates him or her from what he or she sees, and 
from him- or her-self. 
The glass is neither a window nor a mirror, but a reversed 
window and a reversed mirror at the same time. They are re-
versed or rather bidirectional: the glass is both a window that 
shows the subject an outer world to observe, but that can also 
5 The Irish poet and playwright Louis MacNeice (1907–1963) belonged to the generation of 
“Thirties poets” – together with W. H. Auden, Stephen Spender, C. Day Lewis and Christo-
pher Isherwood –, also known as “the Auden group.”
6 The traveler in the poem, who is always a stranger in the world, encounters the Other, the 
face – “an opening in the opening” on the surface of glass. See Emmanuel Lévinas, Human-
ism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
2006), 31. As Lévinas comments, the apparition of the Other is a phenomenon, and, thus, 
image, captive manifestation of its mute plastic form, epiphany of the face’s visitation.
7 Louis MacNeice, “Corner Seat,” Collected Poems: 1925–1948 (London: Faber and Faber, 
1949), 240.
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be reversed, leaving the subject outside, with the cold and the 
fright; and it is also a mirror that shows the reflection of an-
other, of an object – the reflection – that becomes subject, ob-
serving us – as if we were the object – self-assured. It is not 
an either/or issue as perceptive mechanisms can be reversed 
through the action of consciousness, which seems to imply 
always a certain doubling in the self. The surface, the picture, 
can be both object – something to observe – and subject – as 
the self is projected onto it. On the surface of the glass, in this 
barrier-access between self and world, both movements – from 
subject to object and its reversal – co-exist. As MacNeice put 
it in another poem, entitled “Snow”: “there is more than glass 
between the snow and the huge roses”; and it is precisely this 
“more” where the photographic act dwells.8
The glass that separates and reflects, that divides and du-
plicates, has always been an artistic topos that leads to the re-
questioning of representation and reality, and their relation 
(if it were real). Diane Arbus (1923–1971) used her cameras as 
analytical and critical tools. Her beautiful documentary pic-
tures of marginal individuals in the nineteen-sixties tend to 
emphasise the subject’s monstrosity, the Other in (front of) 
the spectator. As thinker and photographer Joan Fontcuberta 
has noted, there is the double existence of a subject who ob-
serves, on the one hand, and an alterity – that of society – that 
is observed.9 Cindy Sherman (b. 1954), another postmodern 
photographer, believes in the impossibility of escaping rep-
8 Louis MacNeice, “Snow,” in Michael Roberts (ed.), The Faber Book of Modern Verse 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1982 [1936]), 281.
9 “la doble existencia, por un lado, de un sujeto que observa y, por el otro, de una alteridad 
– la sociedad – que es observada.” Translated from Joan Fontcuberta, El beso de Judas: 
Fotografía y verdad (Barcelona: Gustavo Pili, 2004 [1997]), 45.
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resentation and, thus, denies the aforementioned double ex-
istence – if there is nothing beyond codified languages, then, 
there will not be an external reality; an Other, distinct from 
the observing subject. In my opinion, both positions could be 
reconciled in the photographic act, as in the previous example 
of the traveller who looks through/at the train window. The 
act of gazing is always double. As Fontcuberta explains, “the 
language – photography – establishes the bridge between ob-
ject and subject.”10 The metaphor of the bridge expresses this 
doubleness, since bridges connect, and indicate an essential 
separation too. 
The (meta-)reflection on the gaze seems to be an essential 
preoccupation of photographers from the very beginnings of 
photography. What has been considered the first photograph, 
taken by Joseph Nicéphore Niépce in 1827, shows Niépce’s win-
dow and the views he saw everyday from his study.11 It is worth 
noting at this point that the first photographs were mirror-
reversed images, and that the silver salts were put on glass 
plates. Mirrors and windows have thus always been at the very 
heart of the photographic act. Many photographers have used 
the double nature of the glass aesthetically and metaphysically, 
turning it into a symbol of the ontological ambiguity – anxi-
10 “el lenguaje – la fotografía – establece el puente entre objeto y sujeto.” Translated from  
Fontcuberta, El beso de Judas, 45.
11 The image is entitled View from the Study Window. In the window of his workroom 
at his Saint-Loup-de-Varennes country house, Le Gras, Niépce set up a camera obscura, 
placed within it a polished pewter plate coated with bitumen of Judea, and uncapped the 
lens. “After at least a day-long exposure of eight hours, the plate was removed and the latent 
image of the view from the window was rendered visible by washing it with a mixture of 
oil of lavender and white petroleum which dissolved away the parts of the bitumen which 
had not been hardened by light.” Harry Ranson Center “The First Photograph” (University 
of Texas).
69
ety? – that follows Cartesian or dual thinking.12 We feel the 
impulse of wanting to recognise the content or meaning of a 
representation either in the subject or in the object; we do not 
assign it to both, or to something un-definable between both, 
or to the sum of both realities.13 Nevertheless, we sometimes 
realise that the content of the relation between subject and ob-
ject, between self and other, can be located indifferently in the 
object or in the subject, awakening epistemological doubts, as 
representation reveals itself as ambiguously dual.
In front of the glass, we are subject–object, self–other, sin-
gle–double. Solitary, isolated and distanced, like MacNiece’s 
traveller, in two pieces, since we are company and presence to 
our selves. The image that contemplates itself is never alone, 
much like Jorge Luis Borges or Buster Keaton14 when they were 
in the company of a mirror or a window. The reflected image 
stays in a state of both fusion – images over-impose on each 
other – and also separation – the inviolable glass separates 
both images. As Jean-Luc Nancy formulates it, “[t]hrough the 
mark that it is, it [the image] establishes simultaneously a with-
drawal and a passage that, however, does not pass.”15 It seems 
12 From Joseph Sudek’s classical atelier-window to more contemporary examples such as 
Sabine Hornig’s transparent picture (exhibited in a shop-window installation in Malmö, 
1995), Uta Barth’s intimate in-between window (2000), Naoya Hatakeyama’s Slow Glass 
series (2002), or Ryuji Miyamoto’s sightseeing window (“Palast,” 2004), photographers have 
focused their attention on the surface of glass.
13 Kelley Ross, “Ontological Undecidability,” 1996. My emphasis.
14 Buster Keaton is the protagonist of Film (1964), written by Samuel Beckett and directed 
by Alan Schneider. Film takes as its basis Berkeley’s theory esse est percipi. The protagonist 
feels haunted by perception, and he ends up covering windows and mirrors in order to be 
left alone in peace. Nevertheless, even after all outside perception has been suppressed, self-
perception remains. After tearing apart all the pictures he still feels chased by himself.
15 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert D. Richardson & Anne E. O’Byrne 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 3.
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that the separation imposed by the glass, its distancing, is the 
cause of the feeling of loneliness in the subject separated from 
the object, from the other, in the conscious thinking of him- 
or her-self as a hermetic and isolated self. It is precisely this 
separation between subject and object that allows the existence 
of desire, causing movement towards the out-side and to the 
in-side. As we shall see, it is the in-between space in which 
approximation can take place.
The observer sees him- or her-self reflected onto that which 
he or she wants to observe, and consequently, it prevents him 
or her from escaping into the other. The gazing traveller no 
longer feels isolated. But then, it seems that the reflection, the 
reflected other, is the isolated one. As Jean Baudrillard has 
commented, it is not the other that catches the photographer’s 
attention, but what is left of the other when the photographer 
is not there (quand lui n’est pas là). We are never there in the 
real presence of the object.16 This absence-presence has more 
do to with time in a space, rather than with space alone. The 
concept of time is also essential.
The moment of the photographic act, which is an irrevers-
ible instant, immediately passed, should not be confused with 
the simultaneity of real time.17 Reality as experienced and the 
photographic act have different “times.” As MacNeice’s travel-
ler is on the train staring at and through the window, there is 
a change in perception as the subject changes his focus from 
the surface to that which is behind, at a distance. He or she 
cannot really look at both realities at the same time, as human 
16 Jean Baudrillard, “La Photographie ou l’écriture de la lumière: Littéralite de l’image,” in 
L’Echange impossible (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 179.
17 Jean Baudrillard, “Photographies.”
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sight can only focus on a given depth of field: the human eye 
focuses on an object at a given distance through “accommoda-
tion,” that is, it does this through a mechanism that allows us 
to change our focus. When we want to focus on a close object, 
we involuntarily contract the ciliary muscles, which pull the 
ciliary body slightly forward and inward, reducing the ten-
sion on the suspensory ligaments attached to the lens capsule. 
When the tension is reduced, the elastic lens becomes thicker 
and we focus on objects further away.18
It could be philosophically argued that both the outer land-
scape and the inner reflection co-exist on the surface of the 
glass, as in a photograph. However, when dealing with human 
sight scientifically, it becomes, physically, an either/or issue. 
Our ciliary muscles are either relaxed and we see what is dis-
tant, or they are tense and we see what is close. Nevertheless, 
in photography, the eye of the camera can catch both ontologi-
cal realities – here–there, inside–outside, in front of–behind – 
through the choice of a closed aperture – the lesser its aperture, 
the greater the depth of field – but it can only do so through 
an alternation sight–blindness alternation. A camera catches 
the world’s light through a quick opening and closing of the 
shutter, a mechanical blink.19 The interval between the opening 
and the closing of the shutter depends on the selected speed 
18 Anon., “Ciliary muscle,” Wikipedia: “When the ciliary muscle contracts, it pulls itself 
forward and moves the frontal region toward the axis of the eye. This releases the tension 
on the lens caused by the zonular, which causes the lens to become more spherical, and 
adapt to short range focus. The other way around, relaxation of the ciliary muscle causes 
the zonular fibers to become taut, flattening the lens, increasing the focal distance, increas-
ing long range focus.”
19 The eye is also said to observe better when interrupting observation. As Barthes ex-
plained in Camera Lucida: Ultimately – or at the limit – in order to see a photograph well, 
it is best to look away or close your eyes (57).
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that will determine the exposure time of the image. In a sense, 
through this necessary blinking that produces the photograph, 
the world is both present and absent, reproduced and erased. 
As Baudrillard points out, the world is interrupted because of 
the subject’s discontinuity – made patent in the reflex blinking 
of the human eye and of the camera shutter: “It falls to the very 
grain of the details of the object, the play of lines and light, to 
signify this interruption of the subject – and hence the inter-
ruption of the world.”20
When we take a camera we realize the existence of reflec-
tions and backgrounds on the double-natured glass. However, 
we mostly ignore the process as we automatically focus on that 
which interests us. Accommodation is a reflex movement we 
forget about, like blinking. In a sense, if we want to see both 
realities we have to “blink” epistemologically, to shift our per-
ception instantaneously, to see one and (then) the other, both 
existing simultaneously, but perceived through their separa-
tion in time, rather than in place. 
I have said before that time is as important as space with 
regard to photography. Photography always includes a trace of 
the reference world inside itself – as it is produced by the im-
pact of photons – both spatial and temporal, excluding part of 
the world it references. Through the photographic image, “the 
world asserts its discontinuity, its fragmentation, its artificial 
instantaneousness.”21 Pictures multiply, re-present, and at the 
same time erase the world and the self, as they represent a fro-
20 Jean Baudrillard, “La Photographie ou l’écriture de la lumière,” 183.
21 Ibid.
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zen image, which is inevitably not-there. They do not present 
a time and a reality still there.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, photogra-
phy required very long exposure times because the materials 
were not highly photosensitive. Pictures like the one taken by 
Niépce at Le Gras with the camera obscura required day-long 
exposures. At the time, movement could not be registered 
properly, unlike the manner in which cameras can capture it 
today; only static objects could be photographed. Two decades 
later, as chemistry and technology developed, Louis Jacques-
Mande Daguerre reduced the exposure times to 20–30 min-
utes for his daguerreotype22 of the Boulevard du Temple in 
Paris (1838). Passing pedestrians and carriages were absolutely 
absent from the daguerreotype, as the emulsion had no time to 
register them. The street appears completely deserted except 
for soneone who was having his boots brushed. This person 
stood still long enough to be registered on the emulsion. Two 
years later, William Henry Fox Talbot invented the calotype 
process,23 which worked by developing the latent image of a 
briefer exposure. The photographer used this new process to 
make a small experimental portrait of his wife, Constance; it 
had an exposure time of only three minutes. Because of these 
progresses, in October 1840, the human figure had accom-
modated to the photographic medium. Technological devices 
continued developing and improving in the nineteenth and 
twentieth century, and cameras and emulsions adapted to hu-
man timing, reducing exposure to a second or less, reaching 
22 The image is exposed directly onto a mirror-polished surface of silver bearing a coating 
of silver halide particles deposited by iodine vapor.
23 The image is exposed directly on the paper, coated with silver iodide.
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its highest synchronicity with human time-perception with 
Edwin Land’s 1948 invention of the so-called “instant photog-
raphy.” Digital photography was introduced in the nineteen 
eighties.
Photography evolved towards the human conceptions of 
space and time,24 and individuals started – fragmentarily – to 
register their lives, those moments and persons they wanted 
to preserve from the passing of time, from movement. These 
snapshots could be compared in a sense to a continuous 
“blinking,” perceiving things just as consecutive independent 
fixed instants. Moreover, photography is associated with an 
objective delight common to most individuals. This anthro-
pocentric inclination seems logical, as the human has always 
been a key interest in photography, as we feel an essential fas-
cination for our equals, for human faces and expressions. As 
Jean-Luc Nancy states, “[t]he photo – […] an everyday, banal 
photo – simultaneously reveals singularity, banality, and our 
curiosity about one another.”25 It is precisely this human curi-
osity that is at the very core of the photographic act.
Recent biological and cognitive studies have explained that 
our identity and our relation towards others is not a matter of 
distinguishing self from other, and that our fascination with 
the image exceeds the self. It is not only related to self-con-
sciousness but to social abilities such as behaviour and lan-
guage acquisition. In the early nineteen nineties, neuroscien-
tists discovered “mirror neurons” in monkeys, chimpanzees, 
24 With the exceptions of scientific photography, whose focus can be as immense as the 
universe and as minimal as a neutron.
25 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 8.
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human beings – and in some birds.26 Mirror neurons are lo-
cated in the brain’s premotor cortex, and they fire “when an 
animal performs an action,” and also “when it sees another 
(especially a conspecific) perform the same action, or even 
when it sees less than the whole action but can see enough to 
infer the other’s animal intention.”27 The neuron “mirrors” the 
behaviour of the other animal, as though the observer were 
itself acting. As Boyd further states, “when we (and apes) look 
at others, we find both them and ourselves.”28 It seems impos-
sible, thus, not to look at our own reflection in a mirror or in a 
window, as we are designed to be curious and to look at faces. 
There is where our fascination with portraits resides. As Nancy 
comments, “[a] portrait touches, […] [w]hat touches is some-
thing that is borne to the surface from out of an intimacy.”29 
The surface hides an intimacy, “[t]he image throws in my face 
an intimacy that reaches me in the midst of intimacy.”30 This 
intimacy created on the surface is what draws connections be-
tween self and other(s).
Mirror neurons are thought to be important for a person’s 
understanding of the actions of other people – developing em-
pathy and mindreading – and for learning new socio-cognitive 
skills by imitation. They also contribute to the creation of a 
“theory of mind,” which refers to our ability to infer another 
person’s mental state from experiences and behaviour. Human 
beings can hold multiple models of reality in their minds, since 
26 Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition and Fiction (London: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 124.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 4.
30 Ibid.
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we are “capable of meta-representation – of understanding the 
process of representation – and involving beliefs as well as de-
sires, goals, and intentions.”31 As Boyd explains, “‘[b]eing af-
fected by others is a design feature of human beings.’ Through 
mirror neurons and other systems we are wired for emotion-
al contagion.”32 Intimacy is thus shared and communicated 
through the desiring gaze, which reveals itself as an essential 
human mechanism to cope with the world and to learn about 
the self and about others. There is an essential intimacy in the 
gaze and in the captured image. As Nancy recognises:
If it is possible for the same line, the same distinction, to 
separate and to communicate or connect (communicating 
also separation itself…), that is because the traits and lines 
of the image (its outline, its form) are themselves (some-
thing from) its intimate force: for this intimate force is not 
“represented” by the image, but the image is it, the image 
activates it, draws it and withdraws it, extracts it by with-
holding it, and it is with this force that the image touches 
us.33
Returning to MacNeice’s poem, it seems as if the traveller and 
his or her image do not belong to the same time. Maybe be-
cause we tend to think that they cannot co-exist simultane-
ously on the same ontological level – the reality must be either 
in front or behind the glass – that we tend to experience it as 
31 Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 145.
32 Ibid., 163.
33 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, 5.
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something temporal, past. Baudrillard defines objective illu-
sion as the physical impossibility of the co-being of objects in 
real time; everything exists as a recorded/printed version, in 
the absolute disorder of temporal scales, separated and isolat-
ed.34 The act of representation, of duplication, seems to prevent 
the simultaneous co-existence of the represented and the rep-
resentation, even on the surface of the glass. As Borges wrote: 
Todo acontece y nada se recuerda
en esos gabinetes cristalinos
donde, como fantásticos rabinos,
leemos los libros de derecha a izquierda.35
Nevertheless, cinema – photography inserted in time – has 
shown that different realities, different images, can co-exist, 
since the human eye “remembers” an image when it has al-
ready disappeared and “sees” its trace, which merges with the 
next one. Persistence of vision,36 as this effect is called, is exclu-
sive of the eye/brain, as if designed to allow humans to ignore 
the discontinuity of sight, and that of the world and the self. 
Actually, it is in their disappearance that images move and 
breathe, and in their traces that the world and the self appear; 
ambiguously, discontinuously. Only the instant of the photo-
graphic act that stays at the surface and ignores the ontologi-
cal boundary of glass, or the human eye that “sees” even while 
34 Ibid.
35 Jorge Luis Borges, “Los espejos,” 25.
36 Persistence of vision is the phenomenon of the eye by which an afterimage is thought to 
persist for approximately 1/25th of a second on the retina, to compensate for the blackout 
that would be experienced otherwise through blinking.
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blinking, allow the existence and connection of realities, as 
the different images, the previous and the latter, the here and 
the there, fuse.
It is the temporary disconnection, the act blinking that al-
lows a change, a movement. Our intense interest in seeing the 
other(s) is combined with our evolved capacity to understand 
one another through a “theory of mind.” Images – in sight and 
in photography – have to combine themselves through the 
change of point of view, of perspective, or of depth of field, in 
order to have some relational and contextual meaning. 
There is also a spatial disconnection, an interruption of the 
meaning, that occurs in the punctum, that allows the break of 
a fixed system and an escape of the self towards the other(s). 
Roland Barthes’ punctum – which describes the effect of a 
small detail that “shoots” out from an image, and “pierces” 
the subject because the detail signifies something outside the 
parameters of language,37 being thus a hole, a cut, an aporia – 
relates to the subject while reaffirming the photograph’s always 
delusive and ungraspable nature, as the punctum escapes our 
total comprehension.
It is through the empathic force, present in the temporal 
and spatial disconnection that allows movement, that we are 
removed from the world and removed from ourselves, that 
allows the engagement in a never-ending dialogue or transfer 
self-other. The separation between subject and object – be it 
spatial, as glass, or temporal, as blinking – of the photographic 
act, results not in Death, as Roland Barthes has posited,38 but 
37 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, 65.
38 Ibid., 47.
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in the creation of the space for desire and relation, allowing 
the existence of a centripetal movement that brings different 
realities closer in the alternation of perceptions. As Lévinas 
states, the Desire for Others is fundamental movement, pure 
transport, sense.39
As a conclusion, we could state that the ambiguous or 
double nature of framed seeing and of the surfaces, that both 
present the world and reflect the viewer, allow an intermittent 
engagement self-other(s). It is in the flickering perception – in 
the “blink” – where self and other(s) relate to each other, and 
where the world exists and keeps moving.
39 Emmanuel Lévinas, Humanism of the Other, 30.
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Be shellèd, eyes, with double dark
And find the uncreated light
– Gerard Manley Hopkins, “The Habit of Perfection” 
When it has untied its old kinships, the eye is able to open 
at the unchanging, ever present level of things; and of all the 
senses and all sources of knowledge (tous les saviors), it is 
intelligent enough to be the most unintelligent by repeating 
so skillfully its distant ignorance.
– Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic
He was the one surviving Zug: he himself was the monster 
he had been sent to kill.
– Damon Knight, Beyond the Barrier 
This essay covers two main topics: the role of the “double vi-
sion” of the sight/nonsight of blinking in selected fiction of 
Neil Gaiman and China Miéville, and an examination of the 
role of blindness and sight surrounding “Molyneux’s question.” 
In Gaiman’s work “double vision” functions as a synchronic 
representation of diachronic events. This representation is 
important because it makes fleeting change visible. However, 
China Miéville’s novel Perdido Street Station provides an im-
plicit critique of this “double-vision” by re-locating moments 
of movement within the experience Gaiman describes. The 
importance of the role of blinking in a discussion of vision 
and the blind brings forth a question of the ability to see dark-
ness itself. While a number of historical and contemporary 
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thinkers are engaged with in this trajectory, it is the burgeon-
ing field of speculative realism (Latour; Meillassoux; Harman) 
that provides a lodestone. It is here that the immanence of the 
thought of Badiou (but also Deleuze, strongly brought forth 
in DeLanda) is centralized, meaning the manner in which the 
new arises from what already is, rather than from any sort of 
transcendental perspective. This can be seen, for example, in 
Quentin Meillassoux’s positing of the question of ancestrality: 
if all knowledge is based on the observer (relativism), then 
how can we know that the earth is 4.5 billion years old, when 
there were no observes on the earth to observe it for much 
of that time? The answer comes about through a new under-
standing of the object which exists before givenness which is 
developed through the language of mathematics and science, 
although this perspective will also be seen in the scientific at-
tunement of Nietzsche and others. Thus, it can be argued that 
the relational or relativistic position of much cultural theory 
and continental philosophy should be augmented if not re-
placed by a theory of the object in which it will be seen that a 
development of a representation of the lack of relation between 
a subject and object (Harman’s dormant objects) can be the 
locus of where a more fundamental understanding of such a 
relation is to be found. 
7
stupidity, animality, multiplicity, inability. A number 
of works by contemporary fantasy author Neil Gaiman rep-
resent diachronic events synchronically. In his novel Anansi 
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Boys, Gaiman calls these events moments of “double vision.”1 
These moments consist of the co-presencing of the changed 
and the unchanged within a single being at one moment in 
time. While change is everywhere around us, in germination, 
growth and decay, the term “double-vision” indicates the po-
tential of seeing more than one side of a transformation si-
multaneously, thereby presenting a moment of stasis within 
change. One of the important consequences of Gaiman’s dou-
ble-vision is that the movement of change then becomes easier 
to see. 
While Gaiman is perhaps best known for writing the Sand-
man series of comics, here I will be looking at three prose 
works: two novels, American Gods and Anansi Boys, and the 
short story “How to Talk to Girls at Parties.” 
Gaiman’s novel American Gods tells the story of a panthe-
on of deities who were carried to America by their believers’ 
thoughts and deeds, and who are now dying out because of a 
lack of believers and their sacrifices. These “old gods” decide 
to go to war with the new gods of technology, consumer cul-
ture and media, whose worshipers abound. In this sense, as 
Gaiman has stated in a Rain Taxi interview, the novel is politi-
cal in that it is about immigration and “the way that America 
tends to eat other cultures.”2 At the center of the novel lies 
Shadow, to whom the world of the gods is initially invisible. 
He eventually learns that he is the son of Mr Wednesday, who 
1 Neil Gaiman, Anansi Boys (New York: Harpertorch, 2005), 151.
2 Rudi Dornemann & Kelly Everding, “Dreaming American Gods: an Interview with Neil 
Gaiman,” Rain Taxi (Summer 2001):  
http://www.raintaxi.com/online/2001summer/gaiman.shtml.
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is actually the god Odin, among many other incarnations. Mr 
Wednesday enlists Shadow into the fight between the old gods 
and the new.
The first experience of double-vision that Shadow under-
goes happens at the roadside attraction of The House on the 
Rock, and it is located in an experience of the animal. Mr 
Wednesday has attempted to gather as many of the old gods as 
possible in an attempt to rally the troops. Amid the exhibition 
rooms Shadow meets a number of Mr Wednesday’s acquain-
tances, although none of them seem to have any god-like qual-
ities. The transformation of these men into gods takes place on 
an indoor carousel. As the carousel spins, Shadow begins to 
see things differently: “The images that reached his mind [a] 
made no sense: [b] it was like seeing the world through the [c] 
multifaceted jeweled eyes of a dragonfly, but [c] each facet saw 
something completely different, and he was [d] unable to com-
bine the things he was seeing, or thought he was seeing, [a] 
into a whole that made any sense.”3 This quote presents four el-
ements of double-vision, which are then given a surplus of co-
presencing as the scene progresses below: [a] a lack of making 
sense; [b] animal vision; [c] multiplicity; and [d] not-doing. 
The experience described here is framed at beginning and 
end by a lack of sense [a]. The images that reach Shadow’s 
mind “made no sense” at first, and in the end he is “unable” to 
make the images into a whole which “made any sense.” Such a 
“removal” from sense has traditionally been taken up from a 
number of perspectives: the voice of the animal, madness and 
the kernel of trauma resistant to symbolic reification. Such a 
3 Neil Gaiman, American Gods: The Author’s Preferred Text (London: Headline, 2004), 144.
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refusal finds another theoretical counterpart in Ronell’s Stu-
pidity which traces the unthought of puerility throughout a 
number of literary and philosophical sources. Stemming from 
the doubled primal scene of Deleuze’s call for stupidity as the 
adequate determination of thought in Difference and Repeti-
tion and Samuel Beckett’s claim to his distinction from Joyce in 
his well-known New York Times interview from 1966 with Is-
rael Schenker where he states that “Joyce tended toward omni-
science and omnipotence as an artist, but I’m working with im-
potence, ignorance,”4 Ronell’s investigation of stupidity takes 
the form of a double-figure which both uncovers its traumatic 
resonances which open up structures of knowledge to change 
and difference and its oppressive dismissiveness: “Whether in 
the precincts of the literary or the psychological, stupidity of-
fers a whirligig of imponderables: as irreducible obstinacy, te-
nacity, compactedness, the infissurable, it is at once dense and 
empty, cracked, the interminable ‘duh’ of contemporary usage. 
A total loser, stupidity is also that which rules, reproducing it-
self in clichés, in innocence and the abundance of world. It is 
at once unassailable and the object of terrific violence.”5 Thus, 
stupidity is a figure of the double, in that it is “at once” both 
ubiquitous and disruptive. The “ability” of stupidity to be si-
multaneously multiple is because of its removal from sense, 
following the coordinates of potentiality laid out above. In fact, 
for Ronell, not-doing is in a sense ethical: “It becomes ethically 
necessary to find a way rigorously to affirm nonworking, to 




subsidize rest, laziness, loosing around without succumbing to 
common criminalizations or devaluations of the logic of other 
activities.”6 Thus, there is a need to foreground the practicality 
of the “removal” from doing of theory.
One manner in which to represent “not doing” for human-
ity is through a connection with the animal. The second ele-
ment [b] of the quote from American Gods indicates that the 
visual experience Shadow is undergoing is like the “multifac-
eted jeweled eyes of a dragonfly.” While the tens of thousands 
of lenslets of a dragonfly eye actually allow it to see in a radius 
of 360° rather than in any sort of fractured sense,7 which is per-
haps indicated by Gaiman’s use of “like […] but” in this quote, 
what is important about the metaphorical use of insect vision 
is what it indicates regarding the possibilities of seeing. As I 
have argued elsewhere, a powerful example of this metaphor 
can be found in the artwork of Diane Thater, whose Knots + 
Surfaces (2001), for example, provides a representation of the 
discovery made by mathematician Barbara Shipman that when 
a schemata of a six-dimensional object is turned into a two-
dimensional one, the curves produced are similar to the pat-
tern that bees produce when dancing. Thus, Thater created an 
installation in which the multiple vision of the “quantum bee” 
is represented through multiple projections on multiple planes 
of a gallery-articulated space.8 What Gaiman and Thater are 
6 Ronell, Stupidity, 56.
7 Brian Handwerk, “Animals Eyes Provide High-Tech Optical Inspiration,” National 
Geographic News (2005): 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/12/1205_051205_animal_eyes_2.html.
8 Brian Willems, “Diana Thater: Pet Fixations.” artUS 27 (2009), 94. However, fractured-
ness is not to be coupled with totality. See Brian Massumi’s history of “total vision” in 
Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham & London: Duke University 
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trying to do is represent the world of one creature to another. 
In a sense this acts as a reading of Jakob von Uexküll’s Um-
welt, otherwise known as a function-circle. As Von Uexküll 
describes in his Theoretical Biology, the function circle of the 
animal consists of responses to stimuli, which then affect the 
outer world, which then influence the stimuli. Such a peri-
odic circle is the function-circle of the animal: “For each indi-
vidual animal, however, its function-circles constitute a world 
by themselves, within which it leads its existence in complete 
isolation.”9 For the animal, the world is always something that 
is crossed out: inaccessible as a whole; the human is able to 
access the world as a whole through language, which is the un-
derpinning unthought of Heidegger, as Derrida has shown in 
Of Spirit.10 However, Gaiman’s use of animal vision indicates an 
opening up rather than a closing off which, as Agamben argues 
in his reading of Von Uexküll in The Open, also happens on the 
level of the animal itself, as can be seen in how the threads of 
a spider web “are exactly proportioned to the visual capacity 
of the eye of the fly, who cannot see them and therefore flies 
Press, 2002), 144–52.
9 Jakob von Uexküll, Theoretical Biology (New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 
1926), 126. One of the most important contributions of Von Uexküll is disregarding a 
superiority of the human’s function circle when compared to the animals: both are seen 
through their “limitations.”
10 However, as Simon Critchley argues, Heidegger’s description of crossed-out being 
is “an attempt to render Being invisible that simply makes it more visible,” Very Little – 
Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (London: Routledge, 1997), 17. Therefore, the 
unthought of Heidegger was stated thus: his investment in developing the gap between the 
poverty of the non-human being and the human-being’s being-in-the-world only makes 
poverty more visible, and thus, in a reflexive manner, enacts an allegory of the human 
condition. Or, as Floyd Merrell claims: “Within each organism, along the functional cycle 
or information-conveying loop, external signals enter and become internal signals, having 
been processed in the transition according to our particular capacities,” Sensing Corpore-
ally: Toward a Posthuman Understanding (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 266.
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toward death unawares. The two perceptual worlds of the fly 
and the spider are absolutely uncommunicating, and yet so 
perfectly in tune that we might say that the original score of 
the fly, which we can also call its original image or archetype, 
acts on that of the spider in such a way that the web the spi-
der weaves can be described as ‘fly-like.’”11 Thus the mutual 
development between fly and spider is both an example of the 
“with” but also of distance, as they are “uncommunicating,” an 
aspect which forms a key point in the discussion of speculative 
realism below, because it indicates a presence of something 
beyond the givenness of perception.
The third and fourth elements of the quote from American 
Gods, multiplicity [c] and not-doing [d], are often paired in 
critical work on potentiality. However, an important distinc-
tion needs to be made. Shadow is not in a position of “poten-
tiality” here. It is not that he could make sense of what he is 
seeing but is choosing not to. Rather, he is “unable” to do so. 
This inability removes him from the economy of potentiality 
because there is no “writing table” of ability which can come 
forth when that ability is not exercised. In this sense Shadow 
is dumb, or stupid, in that he simply cannot. However, this 
stupidity is also connected to the multiple. This inability needs 
to be taken seriously. It is connected not only to Ronell’s work 
but also the “uncommunicating” aspect that Agamben notes 
in the relationship between the spider and the fly. In other 
words, what is being developed is a relationship along the lines 
of what Graham Harman calls the “dormant object,” meaning 
11 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 42.
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an object that exists outside the human domain, even outside 
any relationship to the human domain, although nonetheless 
it is something to which we have access:
Yet there may be other objects that do have real parts that 
make them real things, but still have no relation to anything 
further; precisely for this reason, they will currently have 
no psyche. We might call them “dormant objects,” a notion 
excluded in advance by every relationist philosophy. The 
dormant is the sleeping, and though perfect sleep may be 
impossible for dreamers like us, nightly sleep is our clos-
est approach to the freedom from relation in which we are 
most ourselves. Perhaps God is not the most alert of all be-
ings, but rather the most oblivious.12
Harman is not describing the “not-doing” of potentiality; he 
is describing objects without relation, rather than those which 
could have but choose not to have relation. However, such 
“stupid” objects are also connected to multiplicity, freedom, 
even the omnipotence of God. Thus, Harman delineates much 
of the work of this essay: developing the coordinates of the 
relationship between the relationless and change.
7
the diachronic in the synchronic. The scene under dis-
cussion from American Gods takes place in front of a carou-
sel. The circular nowhere of the carousel mirrors the man-
12 Graham Harman, Circus Philosophicus (Hants: O-Books, 2010), 71.
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ner in which Mr Wednesday’s human friends turn into gods 
– through a metamorphosis-within-stasis. The description of 
Shadow’s actual experience of double-vision takes place as he 
observes Mr Nancy (who is the father of the two “Anansi boys” 
in Gaiman’s follow-up novel of the same name).
[Shadow] was looking at Mr Nancy, an old black man with 
a pencil moustache, in his check sports jacket and his lem-
on-yellow gloves, riding a carousel lion as it rose and low-
ered, high in the air; and, at the same time, in the same place, 
he saw a jeweled spider as high as a horse, its eyes an em-
erald nebula, strutting, staring down at him; and simulta-
neously he was looking at an extraordinarily tall man with 
teak-colored skin and three sets of arms, wearing a flowing 
ostrich-feather headdress, his face painted with red stripes, 
riding an irritated golden lion, two of his six hands hold-
ing on tightly to the beast’s mane; and he was also seeing a 
young black boy, dressed in rags, his left foot all swollen and 
crawling with black flies; and last of all, and behind all these 
things, Shadow was looking at a tiny brown spider, hiding 
under a withered ochre leaf.13
What Shadow seems to be experiencing are multiple stages of 
a historical timeline all “at the same time” and “in the same 
place.” Shadow is experiencing all of the morphings of Mr 
Nancy simultaneously, the instantiations of what he once was 
and what he now is, which includes spiders, a boy, and various 
gods. Although Mr Nancy has taken on many forms during his 
13 Gaiman, American Gods, 144. My emphasis.
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life, his past forms are not left behind. However, he is not some 
kind of shape-changer either. He is not sometimes a spider 
and sometimes a small boy. And yet, he is all of these things at 
once. Shadow’s experience of this diachronic within the syn-
chronic begins to indicate a double-vision of metamorphoses.
So, on the one hand, an argument could be made to add 
a new chronotope to those Mikhail Bakhtin laid out in his 
famous essay “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel.” 
Perhaps the “chronotope of the carousel” in which multiple 
events which are diachronically distant become simultane-
ously represented in story-time, although needing to be rep-
resented one-after-the-other on the page. However, a more 
fruitful approach may be an understanding of why Bakhtin 
sees new forms of the representation of time in the novel as 
important. Toward the end of his essay Bakhtin asks: “What 
is the significance of all these chronotopes? What is most ob-
vious is their meaning for narrative. They are the organizing 
centers for the fundamental narrative events of the novel. The 
chronotope is the place where the knots of narrative are tied 
and untied. It can be said without qualification that to them 
belongs the meaning that shapes narrative.”14 Thus, scenes of 
double-vision, because they posit an unusual representation of 
time in narrative, can be seen as a locus for deriving meaning 
from the novel. But the reason that chronotopes carry meaning 
is a structure similar to that of boredom: in the chronotope, 
“Time becomes, in effect, palpable and visible.”15 Thus, as ar-
14 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” in The Dialogic Imagi-
nation: Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1981), 250.
15 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel,” 250.
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gued above, the foregrounding of time can be connected to the 
foregrounding of being, which of course is unbearable, thus we 
always choose the pain of life over the trauma of boredom, as 
Schopenhauer has argued.16
At the same time, there is something more complex going 
on in this quote from American Gods, and that has to do with 
an element of difference within this inmixing; for although 
Shadow is seeing these multiple forms of Mr Nancy at the same 
time and place, he also is not. At the beginning of the quote 
it is stated that he is seeing everything “at the same time, in 
the same place”; however, at the end of the quote there are 
markers of both time and space: “and last of all, and behind 
all these things” there was the figure of a tiny brown spider, 
thus indicating its status as the primary or original manifes-
tation of Mr Nancy. This is not a contradiction, but rather 
a manner in which to map space within the novel, and thus 
bring out the significance of the figure of the carousel. For if 
there is “merely” the multiple without any kind of difference 
contained, then what is being described is a correlationist or 
relational structure which then becomes trapped in its own 
self-reflexivity, as discussed below. But what the carousel does 
is to represent both the diachronic (in the at the same time) 
16 Siegfried Kracauer, in his essay “Boredom,” asks what would happen if one would 
remain within boredom and not be distracted by everyday living: “Then boredom becomes 
the only proper occupation, since it provides a kind of guarantee that one is, so to speak, 
still in control of one’s own existence. If one were never bored, one would presumably not 
really be present at all and would thus be merely one more object of boredom […]. One 
would light up on the rooftops or spool by as a filmstrip. But if indeed one is present, one 
would have no choice but to be bored by the ubiquitous racket that does not allow one to 
exist, and, at the same time, to find oneself boring for existing in it,” The Mass Ornament: 
Weimar Essays, trans. Thomas Levin (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 
1995), 334.
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and the synchronic (in the last of all and behind all things). As-
suming a clockwise rotation, the structure of the carousel can 
be represented thus:
Although American Gods does not provide a map of the move-
ment of the carousel per se, the inscription of space within time 
in the apparently contradictory statements regarding time in 
this passage adds another element to representation, but what 
is it? Of course space plays a great role in Bakhtin’s essay, from 
public squares to landscapes,17 but, as Franceo Moretti argues 
in Graphs, Maps, Trees, there are no maps: “Take Bakhtin’s 
essay on the chronotope: it is the greatest single study ever 
written on space and narrative, and it doesn’t have a single 
map.”18 The figure of a carousel provides a structure on which 
we can map the relation of the diachronic and the synchronic 
of double-vision (and indeed, in Moretti’s chapter on maps he 
is more interested in narratives on which one can map, such as 
17 Bakhtin, “Forms of Time,” 248–9. The first great reading of space within literature is 
Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space, in which, for example, he argues that much mod-
ern dwelling has lost its connection with both vertical and cosmological space. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1994), 27.
18 Franco Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees: Abstract Models for Literary History (London & 
New York: Verso, 2007), 35.
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Mary Mitford’s Our Village, rather than narratives that actually 
provide maps).19 The reason that mapping is important here is 
simple: just as the simultaneity of double-vision makes time 
palpable, the mapping of space foregrounds force: “As in an ex-
periment, the force ‘from without’ of large national processes 
alters the initial narrative structure beyond recognition, and 
reveals the direct, almost tangible relationship between social 
conflict and literary form. Reveals form as a diagram of forces: 
or perhaps, even, as nothing but force.”20
In one sense the novel resists describing what this force 
might be. There are other examples of this kind of multiple-
seeing in American Gods21: however, the mechanics of this vi-
sion are never laid out specifically. Such a refusal to stipulate 
the rational behind an experience is the prerogative of litera-
ture in general, but perhaps especially in the genre of the fan-
tastic in which, as Tzvetan Todorov has argued in his classic 
study, the strange events that happen in a world in fact re-
main unexplained.22 In the scene with Mr Nancy, the narrator 
merely states that “Shadow saw all these things, and he knew 
they were the same thing.”23 However, in another moment of 
double-vision in the novel, a possible clue is provided. It is 
implied that these moments are connected to a shift of vision 
– or a blinking. For example, in one scene Mr Wednesday lays 
19 This attention to location recalls Ian Watt’s dictum that realism includes a hightened 
specificity of place in The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 32.
20 Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees, 64.
21 Gaiman, American Gods, esp. 151; 262.
22 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Rich-
ard Howard (Ithaca & New York: Cornell University Press, 1975), 25.
23 Gaiman, American Gods, 144.
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his hand on Shadow’s shoulder. This causes Shadow to experi-
ence “a dizzying moment of double vision”24 in which he sees 
Mr Wednesday simultaneously as the man he currently is as 
well as “hundreds and hundred of winters” and as a gray man.25 
While the term “dizzy” is not medically precise, it is often con-
nected to a distortion of vision, which then leads to a lack of 
balance. Such a distortion of vision, however imprecise, pro-
vides a gateway into understand the force at work in the re-
lationship between sight and nonsight, or what here comes 
under the aegis of double-vision.
Light-headedness, dizziness and blurred vision all indicate 
a removal from the world, especially from the world of sight, 
while still remaining in that world, although with a skewed 
perspective. This is “the world through blunted sight” which 
Patrick Trevor-Roper traced as essential to art in his book of 
the same name. In his opening chapter, entitled “The Unfo-
cused Image,” Trevor-Roper, an ophthalmologist by trade, 
makes the argument that skewed or otherwise distorted vision 
(myopia, astigmatism, etc.) has been at the root of much of the 
new visions provided by literature and the fine arts over the de-
cades.26 In a famous analysis of the work of Modigliani, Trevor-
Roper argues that it could be the artist’s astigmatism which 
accounts for the manner in which the figures in his paintings 
tend to lean to the left: “Thus, it could just be argued that the 
oblique astigmatic, whose retinal images are sloping, but who 
straightens his percepts, since his touch and intellect tell him 
24 Ibid., 262. My emphasis.
25 Ibid.
26 Patrick Trevor-Roper, The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of 
Defective Vision on Art and Character (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 17–66.
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that the objects are in fact upright, may over-compensate when 
he paints them on his canvas, and the result of this could be 
that the picture we see is sloping in the opposite direction.”27 
It is not passing out or fainting, which would be to leave the 
world completely (even if just for a moment); rather it is hav-
ing one’s vision disrupted, although still in use. Martin Jay, 
who traverses thought from the Greeks to the poststructural-
ists in order to trace alternatives to the superiority of vision in 
his Downcast Eyes, concludes that what is necessary is not a 
turning away from vision but an emphatic Nietzschian “yes” 
to the multiplication of vision based upon a dialectic model:
Indeed, it is precisely the proliferation of models of visuality 
that the antiocularcentric discourse, for all its fury against 
the ones it distrusts, tacitly encourages. Ocular-eccentric-
ity rather than blindness, it might be argued, is the anti-
dote to privileging any one visual order or scopic regime. 
What might be called “the dialectics of seeing” precludes 
the reificiation of scopic regimes. Rather than calling for 
the exorbitation or enucleation of “the eye,” it is better to 
encourage the multiplication of a thousand eyes, which, 
like Nietzsche’s thousand suns, suggests the openness of 
human possibilities.28
27 Patrick Trevor-Roper, The World through Blunted Sight, 61. On such visual gaps cf. 
Rudolf Arnheim’s classic study Visual Thinking (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1969), 89–90.
28 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French 
Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 591.
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What the structure of the carousel does is to combine the 
thought of Trevor-Roper and Jay: there is both the multiplic-
ity of vision enacted in the “at the same place, in the same 
time” of the “middle bar” of the diagram above. This aspect 
of double-vision is seen in the manner in which Shadow sees 
the multiples of Mr Nancy, for example, all at once. But at the 
same time there is a disturbance to his vision, represented by 
two ends of the disc in the diagram, represented by “the last of 
all” and “behind all things.” Here, we have both a temporal and 
spatial disruption to multiplicity, a disruption which the work 
of Trevor-Roper connects to a “weakness” of vision, and which 
Gaiman connects to dizziness or blurred vision. Thus, the force 
that the “map” of the carousel indicates is that of a “dizzifying-
multiplication,” or what will be called below “pure presence.”
A final example of double-vision from American Gods 
makes the connection between blurred and multiple vision ex-
plicit. In this scene Shadow himself dies, although he is shortly 
to return to life. As Shadow is being ferried across the river 
Styx a smoking oil lamp hanging at the front of the boat causes 
a blurriness of vision. It is then that Shadow is able to see the 
psychopomp boatman (who he knew as Mr Ibis in real life, 
when he was alive) in his multiple incarnations: “The smoke 
stung Shadow’s eyes. He wiped the tears away with his hand, 
and, through the smoke, he thought he saw a tall man, in a suit, 
with gold-rimmed spectacles. The smoke cleared and the boat-
man was once more a half-human creature with the head of a 
river-bird.”29 Although Mr Ibis does not appear as both crea-
tures at once in a strict sense, he does lecture Shadow on the 
29 Gaiman, American Gods, 522.
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prevalence of simultaneity: “You people talk about the living 
and the dead as if they were two mutually exclusive categories. 
As if you cannot have a river that is also a road, or a song that is 
also a color.”30 Gaiman’s sequel-of-sorts to American Gods, the 
novel Anansi Boys, develops the concept of double-vision by 
differentiating it from metamorphosis, or change, per se. This 
difference is in one manner indicated in how, with metamor-
phosis, another element takes the place of dizziness, which is 
storytelling, or the word. The main result of this differentiation 
is that metamorphosis is connected to magic, while double-
vision is connected to experience. 
7
the word of god. Derrida’s well-known critique of nonrela-
tion in Heidegger’s thought attempts to reinstate the primacy 
of language within the “question” of Heidegger.31 Gaiman’s se-
quel to American Gods, Anansi Boys follows a similar path: 
first it sets up the “poetic word” at the heart of change and 
double-vision; then it displaces language with style, which can 
also be called a way of seeing, which was called blurriness in 
the preceding section. 
Anansi Boys tells the story of two sons of Mr Nancy (the 
character in American Gods): Fat Charlie, who lacks self-con-
fidence in all he does, and Spider, who can influence almost 
any person or object in the world on command. Eventually it 
is found that both sons used to be one person, although they 
30 Gaiman, American Gods, 523.
31 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington & 
Rachel Bowlby (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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were split at a young age. Thus, multiple entities being “at the 
same time, in the same place” is central to the novel, although 
this is also disrupted; a structure seen in the diagram of the 
carousel above. The disruption, at first, takes the form of “the 
word.”
The function that the word, or storytelling, has in the novel 
is that it is the means by which Spider exerts his magical influ-
ence on the world. For example, when he meets Fat Charlie’s 
fiancée Rosie, he convinces her that he is actually Fat Charlie 
by simply telling her so, although there is really no physical 
resemblance.32 He also gets Fat Charlie to leave the apartment 
while he brings Rosie over by just telling him to go, which 
overrides any will Fat Charlie has to stop Spider’s seduction.33 
These are just a few among many examples. However, the im-
portance of the poetic word in enacting moments of meta-
morphosis is developed when Spider is captured by an enemy, 
tied spread-eagled, face down, to four stakes in the ground. 
In addition, in order to curb his magic his tongue has been 
cut out. To try and save himself he attempts to create a spider 
out of mud. Eventually he is able to get one of his hands free 
enough to form the spider, but the problem is making the word 
which would breathe life into his creation: he has no tongue: 
“The word, that would be the hardest part. Making a spider, 
or something quite like it, from blood and spit and clay, that 
was easy. Gods, even minor mischief gods like Spider, know 
how to do that. But the final part of Making was going to prove 
the hardest. You need a word to give something life. You need 
32 Gaiman, Anansi Boys, 102.
33 Ibid., 125.
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to name it.”34 What Spider shows here is not that “words” are 
generative but rather “the word,” in the sense of language itself. 
According to Agamben, the “word of God” functions in just 
this manner: it is a form of revelation which is not language 
but which denotes that there is language as such:
If the theological tradition has therefore always understood 
revelation as something that human reason cannot know 
on its own, this can only mean the following: the content of 
revelation is not a truth that can be expressed in the form of 
linguistic propositions about a being (even about a supreme 
being) but is, instead, a truth that concerns language itself, 
the very fact that language (and therefore knowledge) ex-
ists. The meaning of revelation is that humans can reveal 
beings through language but cannot reveal language itself. 
In other words: humans see the world through language but 
do not see language. This invisibility of the revealer in what 
is revealed is the word of God; it is revelation.35
In the quote from Anansi Boys above, it is “making” which is 
impossible for Spider because he has no tongue, and thus no 
language. For Agamben this “making” is seen in the possibility 
of knowledge which is born from entry into the symbolic, thus 
it is also key in forming an understanding of beings without 
the word.36 
34 Gaiman, Anansi Boys, 312.
35 Giorgio Agamben, Man Without Content, trans. Georgia Albert (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), 40.
36 Thus, in Agamben and Theology Colby Dickinson argues that “Agamben too seeks to 
develop a way out of the constitutive split within our linguistically established identities. 
Articulating this resolution through recourse to the inexpressible expression that is God’s 
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However, culture does not originate from culture. Thus, 
the revelatory nature of “the word” as a representation of the 
manner in which humanity comes into the world as knowl-
edge-bearing creatures has recently been given a non-religious 
trajectory by attempts at connection evolutionary theory and 
the development of literature. As Brian Boyd says in On the 
Origin of Stories, “I suggest that we can view art as a kind of 
cognitive play, the set of activities designed to engage human 
attention through their appeal to our preference for inferen-
tially rich and therefore patterned information.”37 This “natu-
ral” propensity for story formation plays a large role in Doug-
las Coupland’s Generation A, which provides a model of the 
effects of the digital on storytelling and opens with “How can 
we be alive and not wonder about the stories used to knit to-
gether this place we call the world? Without stories, our uni-
verse is merely rocks and clouds and lava and blackness. It’s a 
village scraped raw by warm waters leaving not a trace of what 
existed before.”38 In another science fiction example from the 
same year, Cory Doctorow’s Makers, a “ride” has been cre-
ated in which a number of inventions can not only be viewed 
but also contributed to and commented on. During the ride 
one has the chance to use a joystick to either “–1” or “+1” ele-
ments of the exhibition and robots, in real time, make adjust-
voice beyond all attempts by language (or scripture) to say it would seems to overlap in 
this sense with Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. […] As much as Agamben has of late been 
interested in erasing all boundaries between the glorious body and the earthy one, there 
remains in this investigation of immanence an expression of our being beyond all linguistic 
forms and representations.” (London & New York: Continuum, 2011), 170.
37 Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, and Fiction (Cambridge & 
London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 85.
38 Douglas Coupland, Generation A (London: William Heinemann, 2009), 1. Although 
Coupland does equate storytelling with praying (ibid., 2).
104
ments to the ride to reflect these scores (and there are multiple 
rides throughout the United States, all linked to the original 
in Florida). The reason that this example is being brought in 
here is that eventually the feedback provided by the many rid-
ers “naturally” turns the ride into a story instead of a collec-
tion of random inventions. One of the main characters says 
that it is “Not so weird. People see stories like they see faces 
in clouds. Once we gave them the ability to subtract the stuff 
that felt wrong and reinforce the stuff that felt right, it was 
only natural that they’d anthropomorphize the world into a 
story.”39 The “playing” that Boyd centralizes comes forth in the 
example from Doctorow in the manner in which people can 
provide feedback. What both of these examples indicate is a 
“noncultural” explanation of culture.
In Anansi Boys, Charlie’s story revolves around trying to 
claim the power of the poetic word that his brother Spider has 
for himself. Eventually he is able to do so, although his power 
does not rest in his brother’s medium of the word but rather 
in a more “natural” domain: in song. This can be seen the first 
time the meek Charlie makes a stand for himself, deterring a 
man with a gun by singing “Under the Boardwalk” in a res-
taurant.40 Thereafter, it is song that Charlie uses to tap into the 
same powers that Spider has through the word. The reason 
that song is an important counterpoint to the word is that as 
a figure of territorialization/deterritorialization it opens what 
is described below as a speculative manner in which to experi-
ence the non-human world within the human world. The way 
39 Cory Doctorow, Makers (New York: tor, 2009), 176.
40 Gaiman, Anansi Boys, 320–1.
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in which song relates to the territory has been mapped out by 
Deleuze and Guattari in their work on the refrain in A Thou-
sand Plateaus. Here, they argue that song is that which can put 
up a border between ourselves and the outer world: “A child 
hums to summon the strength for the schoolwork she has to 
hand in. A housewife sings to herself, or listens to the radio, 
as she marshals the antichaos forces of her work. Radios and 
television sets are like sound walls around every household 
and mark territories (the neighbor complains when it gets too 
loud).”41 As Boyd argues, the marking of territory is one of the 
main functions that song has for birds,42 or, as Deleuze and 
Guattari put it, “The role of the refrain has often been em-
phasized: it is territorial, a territorial assemblage. Bird songs: 
the bird sings to mark its territory.”43 The reason that song can 
striate space is because of rhythm, which both divides and 
joins; rhythm “ties together critical moments.”44 However, just 
as song can territorialize, and thus eventually become an ex-
pression of knowledge,45 the use of song within the symbolic 
deterritorializes because rhythm is reinserted into expression. 
Thus, the role of the “voice” in bearing the traumatic kernel 
of the real in the film theory of Michel Chion.46 Gaiman indi-
cates the importance of song in the opening of Anansi Boys, 
41 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 311.
42 Boyd, On the Origin of Stories, 76–7.
43 Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 312.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 315.
46 Michel Chion, The Voice in Cinema, trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999).
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in which he states that it is song which can create something 
new in the world:
It begins, as most things begin, with a song.
In the beginning, after all, were the words, and they 
came with a tune. That was how the world was made, how 
the void was divided, how the lands and the stars and the 
dreams and the little gods and the animals, how all of them 
came into the world.
They were sung.
The great beasts were sung into existence, after the Sing-
er had done with the planets and the hills and the trees and 
the oceans and the lesser beasts. The cliffs that bound ex-
istence were sung, and the hunting grounds, and the dark.
Songs remain. They last. The right song can turn an em-
peror into a laughing stock, can bring down dynasties. A 
song can last long after the events and the people in it are 
dust and dreams and gone. That’s the power of songs.47
In this opening passage of the novel Gaiman indicates both 
the territorializing and deterritorializing natures of song. Song 
territorializes because it divides: it is how “the void was divid-
ed” and it sings “the cliffs that bound existence” into presence. 
However, song also deterritorializes, it disrupts the structures 
that it creates: it brings down rulers and dynasties. In the novel 
this dual-nature of the song is represented in moments of dou-
ble-vision, although the previously determined categories of 
“dizziness” and “double-vision” never actually appear together.
47 Gaiman, Anansi Boys, 1–2.
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In one first example, the “dizziness” seen in American Gods 
can be found in Anansi Boys when a ritual is enacted to trans-
port Fat Charlie into the backstage world of the gods:
In Fat Charlie’s mind all the sounds began to blend into one 
strange sound: the humming and the hissing and the buzz-
ing and the drums. He was starting to feel light-headed. Ev-
erything was funny. Everything was unlikely. In the noises 
of the women he could hear the sound of wildlife in the 
forest, hear the crackling of enormous fires. His fingers felt 
stretched and rubbery, his feet were an immensely long way 
away.
It seemed then that he was somewhere above them, 
somewhere above everything, and that beneath him there 
were five people around a table. Then one of the women at 
the table gestured and dropped something into the bowl in 
the middle of the table, and it flared up so brightly that Fat 
Charlie was momentarily blinded. He shut his eyes, which, 
he found, did no good at all. Even with his eyes closed, every-
thing was much too bright for comfort.
He rubbed his eyes against the daylight. He looked 
around.48
In this example, an initial aural confusion sets Fat Charlie off 
balance, which is one of the main effects of dizziness. This con-
fusion is then intensified by actual visual impairment, which, 
however, does not bring about a moment of double-vision but 
rather one of unveiling, for the world of gods is seen to exist 
48 Ibid., 163. My emphasis.
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as “backstage,” always accessible but at no point existing in the 
same time and place as found in moments of double-vision.
However, in another example, which is taken from earlier 
in the novel, an experience double-vision seems to have taken 
place, but it is tied to storytelling rather than dizziness: 
What’s that? You want to know if Anansi looked like a spi-
der? Sure he did, except when he looked like a man.
No, he never changed his shape. It’s just a matter of how 
you tell the story. That’s all.49
In this scene, the narrator addresses the narratee’s skepticism 
regarding Spider’s powers. The wording “he never changed his 
shape” is the only explicit indication of double-vision in the 
novel. However, here it is tied not just to a story, but the man-
ner in which the story is told. This indicates that the word in 
Gaiman is not just connected to a belief in language but to 
the way in which something is said; in other words, there is 
a disruption possible within language itself, just as the song 
of creation remains in creation and can be the engine of de-
territorialization. In the final work of Gaiman’s to be looked 
at, his short story “How to Talk to Girls,” both language and 
dizziness are “combined” in a coordinate they share: the man-
ner in which moments of double-vision are experienced. This 
manner takes the form of the blink.
7
49 Gaiman, Anansi Boys, 45.
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from prior to co-present. While the word and song indi-
cate different mechanisms for change in Gaiman’s work, the 
result of both is the same: an understanding of the change they 
engender can stem from Heidegger’s notion of poetic dwelling. 
Taking the line “…poetically man dwells…” from Hölderlin for 
the title of an essay, Heidegger argues that a poetic relationship 
to the world exists a priori to the everyday manner in which 
we dwell in it.50 Poetic dwelling is a kind of constructing, or 
thinking, the world described as being-in-the-world.51 In this 
essay Heidegger also connects this constructing with a mea-
suring of the world, which is based on the kind of dying which 
is reserved for Dasein:
In poetry there takes place what all measuring is in the 
ground of its being. Hence it is necessary to pay heed to 
the basic act of measuring. That consists in man’s first of all 
taking the measure which then is applied in every measur-
ing act. In poetry the taking of measure occurs. To write 
poetry is measure-taking, understood in the strict sense of 
the word, by which man first receives the measure for the 
breadth of his being. Man exists as a mortal. He is called 
mortal because he can die. To be able to die means: to be 
capable of death as death. Only man dies – and indeed 
continually, so long as he stays on this earth, so long as he 
dwells. His dwelling, however, rests in the poetic.52
50 Martin Heidegger, “…Poetically Man Dwells…”, in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 




Thus, a poetic relationship to the world can be said to be two-
fold: it involves a certain distance from one’s world and it in-
volves the ability to change or form that world.53 The second 
aspect is dependent on the first in that when a being is enrap-
tured in its environment – like a tick which only responds to 
light and movement54 – it does not have the distance to observe 
that environment, to engage in research within it, and thus to 
name and to change it. For, if poetry (and thus capital-L Lit-
erature) is what is removed from everyday language in order 
to fundamentalize the ambiguities within it,55 then philosophy 
can also be seen as not that which constructs the truth (be-
ing enraptured in the world) but that which shows the way 
in which truth is constructed. Both aspects involve a distance 
from the world, a not-participating in it fully, as Derrida indi-
cates in his “law of genre.”56 
Poetic dwelling is central to a short story of Gaiman’s, en-
titled “How to Talk to Girls.” This story features a number of 
girls from another universe who are apparently the last rem-
nants of a destroyed planet. The reason that this story is being 
looked at here is that the girls “are” girls but at the same time 
53 Regarding the role of distance in the origin of poetic dwelling, Véronique Fóti argues 
that “Heidegger himself, stressing that the source, in its de-rivation, exceeds itself and is 
thus not self-sufficient, characterizes the origin as both excess and lack; yet he seeks im-
mediately to embed the source in its hidden ‘ground,’ which, whatever its darkness, stands 
firm. To show forth (zeigen) the origin, he insists, is to establish it firmly and festively (fes-
tigen, festecken) in its essential ground, which is the holy. Such a showing, which renders 
festive and firm, is what he understands by a poetic founding, which also founds itself by 
abiding in a nearness to the origin that keeps open the dimension of distance,” Heidegger 
and the Poets: Poiēsis / Sophia / Technē (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995), 58.
54 Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 46–7.
55 Cf. William Empson, Seven Types of Ambiguity (New York: New Directions, 1966).
56 Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” trans. Avital Ronell, Critical Inquiry 7.1 (Autumn 
1980): 55–81.
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they are also poems. However, they do not change from one 
to the other, as in Anansi Boys, but are simultaneously both, as 
in American Gods. Nevertheless, a part of the make-up of their 
multitude is the word, in the shape of a poem. Thus, they form 
a kind of synthesis of the two novels.
The girls have been shot through space not just to inform 
others of their now-lost world, but in fact to recreate it. A hu-
man, Enn, goes to what he thinks is a normal party when he 
meets the metrically named Triolet, who says “If you want. 
I am a poem, or I am a pattern, or a race of people whose 
world was swallowed by the sea.”57 Although in this passage 
“or” seems to indicate a state of metamorphosis, or of different 
consecutive perspectives, rather than a diachronic experience 
in a synchronic image, when Triolet tells Enn about her back-
ground, it is seen that she is actually all of these things, and all 
of these things at once:
“We knew that it would soon be over, and so we put it all 
into a poem, to tell the universe who we were, and why we were 
here, and what we said and did and thought and dreamed and 
yearned for. We wrapped our dreams in words and patterned 
the words so that they would live forever, unforgettable. Then 
we sent the poem as a pattern of flux, to wait in the heart of a 
star, beaming out its message in pulses and bursts and fuzzes 
across the electromagnetic spectrum, until the time when, on 
worlds a thousand sun systems distant, the pattern would be 
decoded and read, and it would become a poem once again.”58
57 Neil Gaiman, “How to Talk to Girls at Parties,” in Fragile Things: Short Fictions and 
Wonders (New York: Harper, 2007), 250.
58 Ibid.
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Triolet is that poem, beamed out of a star, but at the same 
time she is a girl whispering this poem to Enn. However, the 
whispered poem is not in a language that Enn understands; the 
only way that Enn can comprehend the poem is to be open to 
the experience of Triolet herself, who is the poem she is telling. 
This opening brings about change, de facto: “‘You cannot hear 
a poem without it changing you,’ she told me. ‘They heard it, 
and it colonized them. It inherited them and it inhabited them, 
its rhythms becoming part of the way that they thought; its 
images permanently transmuting their metaphors; its verses, 
its outlook, its aspirations becoming their lives.’”59 Here the 
“openness” that Enn must have does not indicate a stillness, or 
“not-doing” as is often associated with potentiality. Rather, the 
subject is moved. The subject is inhabited, rhythms of thought 
have changed, metaphors have transmuted, aspirations have 
been re-scheduled. The shifting of the subject is a representa-
tion of the imbalance of dizziness. 
Christopher Fynsk, in his chapters on Heidegger in Lan-
guage and Relation, performs a similar move when focusing 
on the noise rather than the stillness of language in Heidegger’s 
work on poetic dwelling. First Fynsk shows the role of not-
doing in Heidegger’s thought: “For Heidegger, the compact 
threshold of poetic language […] is a tombstone, the house is a 
sepulchre ([…] but is already suggested strongly by the images 
of ‘stilling’ in ‘Language’ – however much Heidegger insists 
that such stillness is not the absence but the highest form of 
movement in measure). The accomplished mourning of poetic 
59 Neil Gaiman, “How to Talk to Girls at Parties,” 250.
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remembrance would be an assumption of mortality.”60 How-
ever, Fynsk then proposes another approach, that of move-
ment, or “noise,” in place of stillness and being-towards-death: 
“In Heidegger, the way to language seems to lead inevitably to 
death in the sense of stillness […]. But if we attend more to 
the noise in language than does Heidegger, very different paths 
will open.”61 Fynsk proffers a reading of “noise” by challenging 
Heidegger’s assertion that poetic dwelling precedes the inau-
thentic dwelling of the everyday.62 Instead Fynsk argues that 
the emergence of humanity takes place with language rather 
than prior to it: 
it may not be quite adequate to say, as I did above, that the 
relation of Ereignis [appropriation] and humankind (which 
opens the way and is the way language comes to speech) 
occurs in and through language. For we must also say that 
language occurs – comes to itself – in and by this relation. 
The appropriation of humankind to its essence is not prop-
erly prior to language (in the sense of a condition), because 
all appropriation, including that of humankind, occurs in a 
showing that belongs to the essence of language. Moreover, 
the appropriation of humankind is to be thought as noth-
ing other than an assigning of humankind to language: the 
appropriating of humankind to what is said in the saying 
and as capable of answering to language in a countering 
saying. But if the appropriation of humankind is not prior 
60 Christopher Fynsk, Language and Relation: …that there is language (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), 37.
61 Ibid., 38.
62 Heidegger, “…Poetically Man Dwells…,” 211–12.
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to language, it must nevertheless be understood as in some 
sense co-originary with it.”63
The manner in which the coming forth of humankind is not 
prior to language is seen in Gaiman’s story in the manner in 
which being and becoming (essence and appearance, or the a 
priori poetic and the language of a poem) become “one”: Tri-
olet warns Enn that “Within a generation their children [the 
children of those who have ‘experienced’ the poem] would 
be born already knowing the poem, and, sooner rather than 
later, as these things go, there were no more children born. 
There was no need for them, not any longer. There was only 
a poem, which took flesh and walked and spread itself across 
the vastness of the known.”64 Thus, the poetic words which is 
a multiple of double-vision instigates change, and this change 
is a movement from the a priori of poetic dwelling to an im-
age of “only a poem,” but a poem which dwells in the world 
through its flesh which would walk and spread itself. How-
ever, in order to develop what the role of noise, or “motion,” in 
change, more textual evidence than Gaiman can provide will 
be needed. Thus, a novel from China Miéville will be read in 
order to foreground the role of agitation within double-vision 
as a manner of leading to a discussion of the challenge specu-
lative materialism provides to the “co-presencing” found in 
Gaiman’s work.
7
63 Fynsk, Language and Relation, 97.
64 Gaiman, “How to Talk to Girls,” 250–1.
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subtraction and exteriority. There are three characters 
in China Miéville’s second novel, Perdido Street Station, which 
foreground the manner in which “noise” affects co-presencing. 
The form this foregrounding takes is that the first character 
acts as an experience of double-vision while the other two act 
as critiques of that experience. In short, what Perdido Street 
Station initially posits is that an experience of double-vision 
experience is essentially static. For, while there is a multitude 
represented simultaneously, this multitude, in such an expe-
rience, is stationary. Miéville’s novel then posits two possible 
ways to “rectify” this stillness: first through the addition of 
movement within double-vision, and second though a lack of 
codifying constraints. 
Briefly, the first character in the novel under discussion is 
Lin, who is a “khepri” woman, which means that she has a 
human body and a scarab-like head. She is a sculptor who 
sees with an “insectile vision” which divides the world into a 
multitude of fragments which are each comprehended in their 
uniqueness; thus, Lin takes on a similar position in the novel 
as the multitudinous vision seen in American Gods, which was 
also “insectile.” The second character is Mr Motley, a “remade” 
human whose name indicates the variety of amalgamated body 
parts that make up his person. He hires Lin to sculpt his like-
ness. However, Lin becomes disoriented because Mr Motley’s 
body parts are not just various but they are also constantly 
changing. He berates her for not being fluid enough to see 
him in his multiplicity, claiming that she still has a “base” im-
age of what he was like before. According to Mr Motley, Lin’s 
problem is that, through her sculpture, she is trying “to freeze 
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in time a body in flux.”65 Thus, he begins to point to an expan-
sion of the synchronic representation of the diachronic, as it 
was seen in Gaiman’s work. This “way forward” is the incor-
poration of movement into an experience of double-vision, 
or a combinatory experience of the vision and nonvision of 
the blink. While Lin is ultimately unable to take Mr Motley’s 
advice, for he murders her, a manner in which movement is 
to be experience is offered by the third character under dis-
cussion, a Weaver, which is a kind of interworld spider. The 
key feature of the Weavers is that they are removed from com-
prehension. They are continuous, incomprehensible, rolling, 
and at the same time flat; they do not dream (which becomes 
a source of strength when they fight creatures who feed on 
dreams), they have no hidden messages, no animal cortex to 
contradict a symbolic existence. They have no ego, and they 
are unfathomable to the others in the novel. What these three 
characters offer are three representations of the way in which a 
subject changes when open to an experience of the multitude: 
Lin represents seeing the many rather than the whole; Mr Mot-
ley stresses observing change; and finally the Weavers question 
the role of comprehension itself. What these characters have in 
common is a representation of the effects that double-vision 
need to have in the subject in order to come about.
Perdido Street Station is a novel in the genre of the “new 
weird,” meaning, put simply here, that elements of fantasy are 
included in the story but they have a “scientific” reason to be 
there: for example, there may be dragons, but it is because 
they were engineered in a laboratory (although Jeff Vander-
65 China Miéville, Perdido Street Station (London: Pan Books, 2000), 134.
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Meer, in his introduction to The New Weird, singles out a po-
litical agenda and a fondness for the grotesque as the defining, 
non-structural elements of the sub-genre66). The main plot of 
Miéville’s dense novel is centered on trying to rein in a group 
of “slake-moths” which have gotten loose. The moths are dan-
gerous because they feed on inhabitants’ dreams until their 
prey is rendered inert. 
Lin, the first character taken up in this discussion, eventu-
ally plays a key role in this fight. However, the first thing that 
is noticeable about Lin is that when she is presented at the 
beginning of the novel she is highly sexualized. She is nude, 
cooking at the stove, while her “fully” human lover Isaac re-
mains in bed, the bedcovers seemingly too small to cover his 
girth.67 What is interesting about the description of Lin is that 
before the narrator divulges that she is a khepri, a term which 
then defines her categorically, she is presented “in pieces”; Lin 
is characterized as hairless, with red skin, and is extremely 
muscular. In fact, her muscles were “each distinct. She was like 
an anatomical atlas.”68 The reason why seeing her first through 
details rather than as a “whole” is important is because this 
fragmentation mirrors the way in which Lin experiences the 
world, an experience that is reflected in her physical differ-
ences from Isaac.
Lin’s manner of experiencing the world can be seen the 
first time she is on her own in the novel. After having had sex 
66 Jeff VanderMeer, “The New Weird: ‘It’s Alive?’,” in The New Weird, ed. Ann VanderMeer 
and Jeff VanderMeer (San Francisco: Tachyon, 2008). Cf. William Burling, “Periodizing the 
Postmodern: China Miéville’s Perdido Street Station and the Dynamics of Radical Fantasy,” 
Extrapolation 50.2 (Summer 2009): 326–45.
67 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 11–12.
68 Ibid., 12.
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with Isaac, a relationship which is still taboo enough in the city 
that they cannot be seen out together in public, Lin goes to the 
khepri quarter to pick up some art supplies. It is on this outing 
that Lin’s seeing things in their fragmentary nature rather than 
wholeness comes forth:
Lin’s bulging mirrored eyes saw the city in a compound vi-
sual cacophony. A million tiny sections of the whole, each 
minuscule hexagon segment ablaze with sharp colour and 
even sharper lines, super-sensitive to differentials of light, 
weak on details unless she focused hard enough to hurt 
slightly. Within each segment, the dead scales of decaying 
walls were invisible to her, architecture reduced to elemen-
tal slabs of colour. But a precise story was told. Each visual 
fragment, each part, each shape, each shade of colour, dif-
fered from its surroundings in infinitesimal ways that told 
her about the state of the whole structure.69
The way in which Lin experiences the whole is through the 
part. This line of thought has its most well-known theoretical 
component in the work of Deleuze on the assemblage, which 
he has formulated through the equation (n – 1). As a reminder, 
the assemblage is a gathering of parts which is not necessar-
ily taken as a whole. In a simple example, instead of “a room” 
there are “chairs, a desk, a floor, gravity, light, plumbing, tem-
perature, air” and so on (although the possibility of each of 
these elements being made up of other forces is taken up below 
under a discussion of the irreducible). In the equation (n – 1), 
69 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 20. My emphasis.
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the whole of the room is “taken down” one level and it is the 
elements of the room which remain. As Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, the assemblage “is not the One that becomes Two or 
even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived 
from the One, or to which One is added (n + 1). It is composed 
not of units but of dimensions, or rather directions in motion. 
It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) 
from which it grows and which it overspills. It constitutes linear 
multiplicities with n dimensions having neither subject nor 
object, which can be laid out on one plane of consistency, and 
from which the One is always subtracted (n – 1).”70 Here, Deleuze 
and Guattari combine a number of elements under discussion: 
there is a subtraction from a whole and what this subtraction 
makes visible is “middles,” directions, movement from one-
to-the-other rather than the points in between. These mul-
tiplicities are what Lin experiences in “Each visual fragment, 
each part, each shape, each shade of colour,” although there is 
no motion attached to these directions as such (each element 
resides in her experience, rather than passing through). It is 
movement that the next figure will put into play. 
However, first the notion of the assemblage needs to be 
clarified. It was said that in the assemblage it is the multiplici-
ties which are important rather than the “whole” concept they 
make up. One import aspect of these multiplicities is that they 
are in a relation of exteriority, in that one element (a color) can 
be taken out of one assemblage and put into another, where 
it carries a different function. As Manuel DeLanda explains 
in A New Philosophy of Society: “Today, the main theoretical 
70 Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 21. My emphasis.
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alternative to organic totalities is what the philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze calls assemblages, whole characterized by relations of 
exteriority. These relationships imply, first of all, that a com-
ponent part of an assemblage may be detached from it and 
plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions 
are different. In other words, the exteriority of relations im-
plies a certain autonomy for the terms they relate.”71 The reason 
that these multiplicities are “subtracted” from the One is that 
a relation of exteriority implies that the elements do not relate 
to each other in terms of what they are, but rather in terms of 
what they (can) do:
Relations of exteritority also imply that the properties of 
the component parts can never explain the relations which 
constitute a whole […] In fact, the reason why the proper-
ties of a whole cannot be reduced to those of its parts is that 
they are the result of not an aggregation of the components’ 
own properties but of the actual exercise of their capacities. 
These capacities do depend on a component’s properties 
but cannot be reduced to them since they involve reference 
to the properties of other interacting entities. Relations of 
exteriority guarantee that assemblages may be taken apart 
while at the same time allowing that the interactions be-
tween parts may result in a true synthesis.72
71 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complex-
ity (London & New York: Continuum, 2006), 10–11.
72 Ibid., 11.
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Another word that could be used instead of assemblage is net-
work. For DeLanda, an assemblage/network relates to the new 
in that it can feature certain emerging properties. For example, 
in an interpersonal network, the following emergent proper-
ties can be described: density, or “a measure of the intensity 
of connectivity among indirect links”; stability, in that there 
is no tension created between nodes with different attitudes 
(my friends’ friends are not my enemies) and that proximity 
to other causes similar attitudes to be created; and solidarity, 
although it does not matter what form it takes: “some members 
may be motivated by the feelings of togetherness which getting 
involved in the arrears of the community produces in them, 
others by altruism, and yet others by strict calculations.”73 
However, it is not the specific characteristics that emerge from 
a network which is the focus here, but rather in an assemblage 
there is emergence from parts in a relation of exteriority.
In other words, what is important about the assemblage 
for this discussion is simply the way in which it is the rela-
tion of parts is foregrounded; as Deleuze and Guattari put it: 
“There are only multiplicities of multiplicities forming a sin-
gle assemblage, operating in the same assemblage: packs in 
masses and masses in packs.”74 What is important at this point 
is that assemblages are gatherings of parts in that they can be 
disassembled and reassembled; or as DeLanda words it else-
where, assemblages are both irreducible and decomposable.75 
These features will be taken up below under the discussion of 
73 Ibid., 56–7.
74 Deleuze & Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 34.
75 Manuel DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason (Lon-
don & New York: Continuum, 2011), 185.
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Mr Motley and movement along with the manner in which 
Graham Harman expands Bruno Latour’s version of network 
theory. In addition, such plurality is reflected in the world in 
which Perdido Street Station is set; for, as Nicolas Birns argues, 
in this world “racial diversity is not plurality leading to a har-
monious, diverse multiculturalism, but incommensurability.”76 
This is due to the fact that, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle has noted 
(in a discussion of language), there is no “subject” in relation 
to the assemblage: “An assemblage never refers to a subject…
there is no subject who is the sender of the utterance, no sub-
ject whose utterance is reported. The source of the utterance 
is a collective, whether social, national or political.”77 In the 
context of Gaiman’s American Gods, the assemblage was seen 
when it was not just, for example, the “whole” of Mr Nancy 
which was seen, but rather, when double-vision was experi-
enced the assemblage of all the beings and things which Mr 
Nancy had ever been became visible. However, the “absence” 
of a subject that both Lecercle and DeLanda indicate was also 
seen in “How to Talk to Girls at Parties,” in which the poem 
was to eventually nullify the speaker.
7
pure presence. The structure of double-vision, in this “nul-
lification” of the speaker, needs to be brought forth. For Lin, 
her assemblage-vision is further developed in a passage which 
76 Nicholas Birns, “From Cacotopias to Railroads: Rebellion and the Shaping of the Nor-
mal in the Bas-Lang Universe.” Extrapolation 50.2 (Summer 2009): 203.
77 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Mac-
Millan, 2002), 188.
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relates her attempts at getting Isaac to share her way of expe-
riencing the world:
Lin had tried to describe how she saw the city to Isaac.
I see clearly as you, clearer. For you it is undifferentiated. 
In one corner a slum collapsing, in another a new train with 
pistons shining, in another a gaudy painted lady below a drab 
and ancient airship…You must process as one picture. What 
chaos! Tells you nothing, contradicts itself, changes its story. 
For me each tiny part has integrity, each fractionally different 
from the next, until all variation is accounted for, incremen-
tally, rationally. 
Isaac had been fascinated for a week and a half. He had, 
typically, taken pages of notes and sought books on insec-
tile vision, subjected Lin to tedious experiments in depth-
perception and distance-vision […]
His interest had quickly waned. The human mind was 
incapable of processing what the khepri saw.78
The assemblage can be seen in the manner in which Lin sees 
Isaac’s vision of the whole as chaotic, since it presumably 
“skips over” the multiple relationships between the parts. In 
one sense Lin’s mode of seeing is another way of describing 
double-vision: instead of seeing one element, that element’s 
constituent parts all become visible all at the same time. But 
why is it that the exterior relationship of elements in an as-
semblage creates a “new” or more truthful way of seeing? One 
manner this is examined is through Heidegger’s thought on 
78 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 20–1.
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the tool, discussed below. Alain Badiou, in his essay “Philoso-
phy and Art,” takes such an approach. He identifies four main 
strains of Heidegger’s thought – the question, the earth, a re-
evaluation of the history of philosophy, and poetic-being – and 
then states that it is only the last which retains any resonance 
for contemporary thought.79 Then Badiou lays out three main 
strains of Heidegger’s thought on the poem: 1) he established 
that a poem is not about knowledge but rather alētheia, or the 
uncovering of truth; 2) he showed how poetry is not necessar-
ily a separate entity from philosophy but can be philosophy; 
and 3) this leads Heidegger into the “trap” illuminated by Der-
rida’s critique of nonrelation – this “truth” or philosophy must 
reside somewhere, and Heidegger could not “escape” locating 
it in the word itself.80
The next step Badiou takes is the reason he is being looked 
at here. The question he asks is: what has contemporary poetry 
done to “escape” the “trap” of language that Heidegger sets up 
for himself? Badiou finds two possible paths: Mallarmé and 
Celan. In Mallarmé, Badiou finds “the separation, the isola-
tion, the coldness of that which is only present insofar as it no 
longer has any presentable relationship to reality,”81 meaning 
that such a poem is “pure presence” in that it does not refer 
to anything else, there is no unveilable truth which under-
lies its language; it, like the matheme, is simply not anything 
other than what it is.82 In Celan, Badiou identifies another op-
79 Alain Badiou, Infinite Thought: Truth and the Return of Philosophy, trans. Oliver Feltham 





eration: in order to be confronted with a poem of “pure pres-
ence” one must be open to that-which-is-outside-one’s-self. 
This openness is poetic, because this confrontation with the 
outside involves naming it, and this naming is a poem.83 As 
an example Badiou provides a few lines from one of the short 
poems in Celan’s book Lichtzwang, although perhaps a more 
far-reaching example, at least in relation to Celan’s work as a 
whole, can be seen in the difference between the poems “Death 
Fugue” and “The Straitening.” Both are attempts at inscribing 
the Shoah in language within a dialogue of Adorno’s dictum 
that “All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, 
is garbage.”84
The first poem of Celan’s, “Death Fugue,” is an example 
of Heideggerian poetic-being in that through the form of a 
fugue the poem uncovers a certain relation to the truth of the 
Shoah. However, the poem’s musical structure was perhaps a 
sign that this relation to the truth was too “easy” in relation 
to its subject matter. Thus, “The Straitening” provides an ex-
ample of what Badiou sees as exemplary in Celan’s work: here 
one is confronted with the “pure presence” of the inadequacy 
of language to express. Badiou, like Adorno,85 sees a similar 
function for the language in some of Samuel Beckett’s work. 
At the end of On Beckett Badiou argues: “At the other extreme, 
we find what I will call Beckett’s sarcastic prose. Built almost 
entirely on rhythm, it gratingly utters […] that words are an 
83 Ibid., 99–100.
84 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1990), 367.
85 Adorno says that “Beckett has given us the only fitting reaction to the situation of the 
concentration camps – a situation he never calls by name, as if it were subject to an image 
ban,” Negative Dialectics, 380.
126
inadequate vehicle, that ill saying is always already too much 
of a well saying, and that the counter-path of thought can only 
be rediscovered by throttling words, subjecting them to a syn-
tactical ordeal that forces them to ill ring.”86 Taking a cue from 
Beckett’s late work Ill Seen, Ill Said, Badiou again defines the 
poetic as how the “pure presence” of language without unveil-
ing acts as a name for an event which exists “outside calculable 
interests.”87
The key for understanding this leap in Badiou’s work is the 
connection between the “pure presence” of poetry and the 
matheme. For Badiou, mathematics holds a privileged place 
in the relationship between emergence and immanence. Al-
though no pretence is being made here at fleshing out the rich 
complexities of the role of mathematics in Badiou’s thought, 
meditation seventeen, “The Matheme of the Event,” from Ba-
diou’s Being and Event brings forth both the doubled structure 
and the consequences of the matheme. Here, the example Ba-
diou uses is the French Revolution. The basic argument is that 
the event of the revolution included the revolution as one of 
the terms of its own becoming.88 The matheme Badiou devel-
ops for this argument is as follows: S is a situation (the French 
Revolution); X is the “evental site” that is presented in S (for 
example, “the peasants”); then it can be said that X belongs 
86 Alain Badiou, On Beckett, eds. Alberto Toscano & Nina Power (Manchester: Clinamen 
Press, 2003), 116.
87 Badiou, Infinite Thought, 100. This can be seen, for example, in the difference between 
the text and the performance of Beckett’s play Not I (1972) in which the text includes a 
multitude of ellipses which, with patience, can be filled in by the reader, while the speed of 
the speech in the performance precludes any such cognition.
88 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London & New York: Continuum, 
2005), 180.
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to, or is presented in S, written thus – X ⊆ S; and the event of 
X (in which the peasants become present in the revolution) 
is written ex. This formulation allows Badiou then to express 
that an event is made up of all the multiples of its site, along 
with the site itself:
ex = (x ⊆ X, ex)89
Thus, the matheme indicates “the mode in which the Revolution 
is a central term of the Revolution itself; that is, the manner in 
which the conscience of the times – and the retroactive inter-
vention of our own – filters the entire site through the one of 
its evental qualification.”90 The example Badiou provides of this 
is the declaration of Saint-Just that “the revolution is frozen.” 
In this sense what Saint-Just adds to the revolution “that one-
mark that is the Revolution itself, as this signifier of the event 
which, being “qualifiable” (the Revolution is ‘frozen’), proves 
that it is itself a term of the event that it is.”91 Thus, just as the 
poetry of Mallarmé and Celan indicates the “pure presence” of 
a non-veiled truth, the matheme of the event is immanent, in 
that it is “the one of the infinite multiple that it is.”92
As an additional example provided here for clarification, 
Quentin Meillassoux’s explanation of the transfinite in 
Cantor’s set theory is useful. As Meillassoux explains, the basic 
principle is that if you have a set of a given number of elements 






of all of their possible combinations b (just one, one and two, 
one and three, all, none, and so on), b will always a higher 
number than a, even if a is infinite93; thus the transfinite. The 
reason that the transfinite is such a powerful concept is that 
“the (quantifiable) totality of the thinkable is unthinkable”94 and 
thus the assemblage becomes a more accurate representation 
of the relationship between elements. For Badiou, one of the 
consequences of the uncertainty of the totality of the thinkable 
is that it is a doubled consequence which allows for truth, and 
thus it begins to develop the structure of double-vision: “The 
undecidability of the event’s belonging to the situation can be 
interpreted as a double function. On the one hand, the event 
would invoke the void, on the other hand, it would interpose 
itself between the void and itself. It would be both a name of 
the void, and the ultra-one of the presentative structure. And 
it is this ultra-one-naming-the-void which would deploy, in 
the interior-exterior of a historical situation, in a torsion of its 
order, the being of non-being, namely, existing.”95 Although 
there are a number of elements in this statement that are key to 
Badiou’s thinking, there is not enough space here to develop it. 
For this chapter, it suffices to say that the structure that is being 
described here is that of deterritorialization/territorialization, 
or the synchronic presencing in the diachronic: in other words, 
it is an immanent structure that posits an alternative to the 
poetic-being of Heidegger (although this is done by going 
through Heidegger). This alternative is the “pure presence” of 
93 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. Ray 
Brassier (London & New York: Continuum, 2009), 104.
94 Ibid.
95 Badiou, Being and Event, 182–3.
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the poetry of Mallarmé and Celan, or that of the structure of 
the carousel described above. However, even this mode comes 
under question in Miéville’s novel. When Lin is contracted 
by the “remade” Mr Motley, her way of seeing is criticized as 
being too static (thus, he also contradicts Tim Miller’s claim 
of Mr Motley as a figure of “hybridity”96; in other words, 
the element that Mr Motley introduces to the assemblage is 
movement. The reason that movement is important is that it is 
a signal of the generative, and as such, it has the potential to be 
an intensive property; in other words, movement can generate 
something new.
7
dormant objects. A call for the inclusion of movement 
in such thinking comes about in Miéville’s novel when Lin 
is contracted by Mr Motley to make a sculpture of him. As 
suggested by his name, Mr Motley is a mixture of body parts. 
Therefore, he could be configured as another representative 
of an assemblage: in short, more parts than whole. However, 
Lin has a difficult time even looking at him because all the dif-
ferent parts that go to make up his body are in flux: “The first 
couple of times she had come here, she had been sure that he 
changed overnight, that the shards of physiognomy that made 
up his whole reorganized when no one was looking. She be-
came frightened of her commission.”97 The contrast between 
96 Tim Miller, “The Motley & The Motley: Conflicting and Conflicted Models of Generic 
Hybridity in Bas-Lang,” Foundation 108 (Spring 2010): 39–59.
97 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 133.
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her fragmented vision of the world and Mr Motley’s diachronic 
being come forth is the reason that she is frightened: it is not 
because Mr Motley is somehow scary, but rather that the pros-
pect of trying to capture the fluidity that is Mr Motley’s body in 
the static nature of her sculpture seems wrong: “She wondered 
hysterically if it was like a task in a moral children’s tale, if she 
was to be punished for some nebulous sin by striving to freeze 
in time a body in flux, for ever too afraid to say anything, start-
ing each day from the beginning over again.”98 This scene offers 
an implicit critique of the synchronic experience of diachronic 
events that was found in double-vision.
Lin attempts to cope with the fluctuating body in making 
her sculpture,99 but Mr Motley is not satisfied. He critiques her 
for seeing each of his parts as fragments, rather than seeing 
all of his changing parts as himself all at once as an instantia-
tion of “pure presence,” as Lin still tries to make sense of his 
configuration by attempting to trace reason and origin in each 
of his elements. Mr Motley says: “It’s so… predictable. You’re 
still not looking the right way. At all. It’s a wonder you can 
create such art. You still see this – ‘he gesticulated vaguely at 
his own body with a monkey’s paw’ – as pathology. You’re still 
interested in what was and how it went wrong. This is not er-
ror or absence or mutancy: this is image and essence.”100 Thus, 
Mr Motley indicates that it is “pure presence” that Lin must 
perceive, rather than any kind of poetic-being, which always 
exists with its counter-part, the everyday. 




With the concept of pure presence on the table, a revision of 
Heidegger’s concept of the “everyday” becomes possible. One 
important aspect of poetic-being is that everyday objects are 
never present in their totality. Speaking of a number of com-
mon things found in a bedroom or office, Heidegger says that 
“These ‘things’ never show themselves initially by themselves, 
in order then to fill out a room as a sum of real things.”101 One 
manner in which such things do become present as such is 
when their everyday usefulness comes under question, a line 
of argument which usually follows the motif of the “broken 
tool.” In this sense it is in the “unhandiness” of a broken ham-
mer, for instance, that the hammer as such becomes present.102 
However, as Harman has indicated in his reevaluation of this 
concept in Tool-Being, “the visibility of Heidegger’s ‘broken 
tool’ has nothing to do with equipment not being in top work-
ing order. […] [A]s ought to be expected, Heidegger teaches us 
not about smashed-up blades and chisels, but only about be-
ings in general.”103 The reason that the broken tool acts as a key 
point for taking a step beyond Heidegger is that it encapsulates 
a major aspect of his thought, and that is that authentic being 
(tool-as-tool) and inauthentic being (tool in use and forgotten) 
are always tied together through the “mere” [bloß] in that the 
hammer is not “merely” a hammer, there is also a more fun-
damental comportment which has been forgotten through use 
and which can become experienced through its “brokenness” 
101 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1996), 64.
102 Ibid., 68.
103 Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Peru: Open 
Court, 2002), 45.
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(or, as otherwise developed in Heidegger, through anxiety, or 
boredom). Harman’s program is to retain the dual structure of 
the “mere” but to foreground it into an object of pure presence, 
rather than poetic-being: “The idea of an object-oriented phi-
losophy is the idea of an ontology that would retain the struc-
ture of Heidegger’s fundamental dualism, but would develop 
it to the point where concrete entities again become a central 
philosophical problem.”104 Thus, when Mr Motley stresses to 
Lin that, regarding his body, “This is not error or absence or 
mutancy: this is image and essence” he is also asking her to stop 
looking “behind” the brokenness of the tool for a veiled truth, 
but rather to stick to the presence of the object on the surface: 
it is here that his truth is to be found.
The thrust of Harman’s development of an object-oriented 
ontology can be seen in his split from the actor-network-the-
ory developed by Bruno Latour, who is an important figure for 
this discussion because of the way in which movement is cen-
tral to his theory. For example, one of the five major concerns 
of his theory is with the “nature of actions,” meaning how “in 
each course of action a great variety of agents seem to barge 
in and displace the original goals.”105 What is important for 
Latour here is not that the actor in his theory has some kind of 
agency that other objects do not have, but rather that they are 
“the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward 
it.”106 Thus, in counter distinction to agency Latour suggests the 
term figuration, stressing that it is not the presence or absence 
104 Graham Harman, Tool-Being, 49.
105 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 22.
106 Ibid., 46.
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of agency which determines a subject but rather the flow of 
multiple strands of continually changing influence from other 
actors in a network which causes a subject to act.107 While at 
first this might seem like another version of the assemblage as 
described above, and indeed Latour does call out to Deleuze as 
a like-minded thinker,108 it is precisely at this point of necessity 
of the network of influences as being constitutive of the subject 
that Harman takes umbrage with Latour.
In his essay “The Sleeping Zebra” Harman describes a visit 
to Latour’s apartment in Paris. Latour has to leave and Harman 
is left in the apartment alone, where he dreams of Badiou’s take 
on set theory.109 All this acts as a prelude for Harman’s presen-
tation of his concept of a dormant object. In short, Harman 
sets himself apart from Heidegger’s tool-beings in that objects 
do not have a poetic and everyday aspect to them which we can 
uncover and forget, but rather we interact with objects on the 
sensual realm. However, this is not the crux of the argument, 
for Harman goes a step further by arguing that non-human 
objects relate to each other in the same manner110: “All things, 
both human and nonhuman, must encounter other things in 
the form of sensual caricatures.”111 This is not an attempt, as 
such, to invest objects with a psyche (although this too is a part 
of Harman’s program) but rather to show how the interaction 
of one object with another through thought, memory, fantasy 
or dreaming is only quantitatively and not qualitatively differ-
107 Ibid., 53.
108 Ibid., 129.




ent from when “dust collides with dirt,” since both take place 
on the sensual realm.112 Thus, it is on the sensual that relation 
occurs, and it is on this level that the figure of the assemblage 
emerges: “All that exists is composed of pieces, and obviously 
these must relate in order for the thing itself to exist; every-
thing must first be aggregate in order to become substance.”113 
Thus, Mr Motley’s insistence on Lin seeing his body not in 
terms of what it was or how it is divergent, but rather in terms 
of flux and change, of the relation of his body as a whole, which 
remained his body, not only despite but because of the fluctua-
tions. Harman provides a similar example: “For instance, the 
components of my body change constantly without my always 
becoming different as a result. It is true that a point may be 
reached where this change in pieces is sufficient to destroy 
me. Yet that point must actually be reached; it is not attained 
automatically with every slight shift in the infrastructure of 
human and inhuman things.”114 Thus, it is through movement 
that it can be seen that there are times when an outside influ-
ence might have no effect on an assemblage (a feather brushes 
up against an oil tanker). Harman extrapolates that “if an ob-
ject can exist apart from any specific situation, it can also exist 
apart from any situation at all”115; and thus the concept of the 
sleeping object is born, meaning an object which, like a person 
in deep sleep, has no relation to the world outside itself, and yet 
it still exists.116 The dormant object thus forms another manner 






in which to approach pure presence, for as “sleep entails that 
the thing still exists, but simply without relation to anything 
else”117 so does pure presence exist without relation to anything 
“underneath” but rather in the manner in which it is twisted 
from its underlying sense.
In the case of Mr Motley, the object without relation takes 
the form of a “ruptured moment” in which there is an expe-
rience of pure presence without recourse to sense. This last 
concept of Mr Motley’s will lead this reading of Perdido Street 
Station into its final phase, a discussion of an experience of 
non-knowledge, the framework for which is provided by the 
spider-like Weavers of Miéville’s novel. What is interesting 
about the Weavers is that they are creatures which are repre-
sented as being removed from understanding. This removal is 
key because it is what Mr Motley seems to think Lin is missing 
in her extensive way of seeing the world: “’Maybe I’m too hard 
on you,’ Mr Motley said reflectively. ‘I mean… this piece before 
us makes it clear that you have a sense of the ruptured mo-
ment, even if your question suggests the opposite… So maybe,’ 
he continued slowly, ‘you yourself contain that moment. Part 
of you understands without recourse to words, even if your 
higher mind asks questions in a format which renders an an-
swer impossible.’”118 What Mr Motley is representing here is, 
in the words of Deleuze and Guattari quoted above, the as-
semblage’s “challenging the hegemony of the signifier.” Such a 
challenge becomes apparent in the figure of the Weavers, who 
do not relate to the world in a human fashion, seen primarily 
117 Ibid., 73.
118 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 141.
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in their lack of dreaming. Instead they posit another relation 
to the world, that of pure presence.
7
nonsense. The Weavers, who are the only beings in the novel 
who are able to defeat the slake-moths and thus save the city, 
are represented as beings which exist outside normal conduits 
of understanding: 
The Weaver thought in a continuous, incomprehensible, 
rolling stream of awareness. There were no layers to the 
Weaver’s mind, there was no ego to control the lower func-
tions, no animal cortex to keep the mind grounded. For the 
Weaver, there were no dreams at night, no hidden messages 
from the secret corners of the mind, no mental clearout of 
accrued garbage bespeaking an orderly consciousness. For 
the Weaver, dreams and consciousness were one. The Weav-
er dreamed of being conscious and its consciousness was its 
dream, in an endless unfathomable stew of image and desire 
and cognition and emotion.119
Here the Weavers, on the one hand, represent Badiou’s math-
eme discussed above, in which the concept of revolution fig-
ured as a set of revolution itself. In this example from Perdi-
do Street Station, dreams and consciousness are terms which 
follow a similar economy, not in the sense however that the 
Weaver dreamed of being conscious or that its consciousness 
119 Miéville, Perdido Street Station, 769. My emphasis.
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was a dream, but rather how both are a part of and more than 
the set of the unfathomable stew of cognition. For the Weaver 
consciousness and dream exist in each other and yet are also a 
surplus of each other. This is an example of the pure presence 
that Badiou saw in Mallarmé, Celan and Beckett.
There is another aspect to the description of the Weavers 
here that has a parallel in Harman’s thought, and that is the 
manner in which the Weavers are removed from sense and un-
derstanding. This was what Mr Motley said Lin needed to do 
in order to see him, to have an experience of his body separate 
from the words and images she would fit it into. This aspect 
of Miéville actually has a direct correlate in Harman’s work, in 
that Harman’s essay “Offshore Drilling Rig” uses as its setting 
an experience Harman and Miéville shared together of being 
stuck on the offshore drilling rig of the title for a number of 
hours. Although the validity of the story must remain in sus-
pension (the helicopter pilots that dropped the two off on the 
rig crashed and died just as they were out of view, and a flag 
that Harman waves at the end has an uncanny resemblance to 
the one with a picture of a sleeping zebra in the essay of that 
title), it is interesting to note that the point of the essay is ac-
tually how objects never interact with each other directly, but 
this interaction always takes place through the sensual. In a 
bow to the setting in which they find themselves, Harman cre-
ates a fantastical picture of a multitude of oil rigs able to siphon 
objects from the past or future into the present, except they are 
not able to siphon the actual objects, but just their images.120 
He then grants all objects this power, and imagines that some 
120 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 45–8.
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of this siphoning of images affects the object being siphoned, 
and some does not.121 The point of this rather obscure image is 
that some contact between objects can affect and change some 
objects, while other types of contact has little or no effect. This 
then opens the space for some objects to be not affected by 
forces, and thus the dormant object becomes possible. While 
there is nothing inherently valuable about the appearance of 
Harman and Miéville together in this essay, it does indicate 
that there is a connection between Miéville’s work and pure 
presence, and this connection has been shown to lie in the 
manner in which the Weaver is nothing else but what it is: 
there is no depth of poetic-being within it. And this is the lo-
cation of its power in the novel; for it is the only figure who is 
able to defeat the deadly slake-moths who have run rampant. 
In this sense the Weaver challenges the hegemony of the signi-
fier by being “flat”; there is no separation between subject and 
experience. The Weaver is in itself incomprehensible to hu-
manity; this is because the Weaver is all “image and essence,” 
as Mr Motley states. However, it needs to be kept in mind that 
this image and essence of pure presence is still an image which 
is seen. Thus, the next section takes up an investigation into 
the role of sight in moments of double-vision.
7
molyneux’s question. One of the main tenants of Harman’s 
thought is that in order to develop a concept of pure presence 
121 Harman, Circus Philosophicus, 50.
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the relation between objects must remain in the sensual. How-
ever, a problematic aspect of this thought is that all aspects of 
the sensual are not the same, and it is usually vision which is 
seen as the privileged sense. This section aims to provide a 
brief historical account of attempts at challenging the hege-
monic role that vision plays in an understanding of the senses 
with the aim of developing double-vision as an alternative sen-
sual experience to the dominance of sight. The first step, in 
this section, is to pose the question, which takes the form of 
a dialectic in that blindness and sight are seen to be located 
asymmetrically in each other. Then, in the next section, it is 
argued that vision can actually disrupt knowing, and it is only 
when the unveiling truth of poetic-being is countered with 
an understanding of sensory relations that the truth of seeing 
comes forth. In one sense, this latter position is impossible 
for much of the argument surrounding this historical account 
because many of the figures cannot imagine an experience of 
vision which is separate from language. However, it will be 
seen that within the textual descriptions of experiments in vi-
sion from the 18th century there is a space opened for a rupture 
with language, however slight. This “space” is then taken up 
in the next section through the thought of a number of con-
temporary figures.
This discussion of double-vision centers around what is 
called “Molyneux’s Question.” The background to this ques-
tion begins with English surgeon and anatomy professor Wil-
liam Cheselden, who, in 1728, invented iridotomy, a surgical 
method for curing certain forms of blindness by making an 
incision in the iris. Cheselden’s method was an advance in 
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ophthalmic technique because, as Harry Mark observes, the 
previous barber-surgeons “entered the eye blindly without 
accurate knowledge of its anatomy or the actual mechanism 
of the surgery.”122 In contradistinction, Cheselden performed 
the procedure “with true awareness of the ill it was supposed 
to cure, and the reason for its effect.”123 Although Cheselden 
only offered a short description of his technique,124 its effects 
were immediately apparent: a cure that had itself once caused 
a “formidable mortality”125 became relatively safe and routine 
for the next 150 years.126 The reason Cheselden is being used 
as the opening figure in a discussion of the role of vision is, 
in fact, twofold: first, Cheselden is located at the beginnings 
of a standardized relation to the body that resulted in increas-
ing the number of lives saved because of a clearer perception 
of the way anatomy functions127; second, the new technique 
of iridotomy addressed one of the pressing questions of con-
sciousness of both Cheselden’s time and ours by allowing a 
boy who had been born blind to be cured, thereby advancing 
122 Harry Mark, “The Strange Report of Cheselden’s Iridotomy,” Archives of Ophthalmology 
121 (Feb 2003): 266. For a brief but insightful overview of 18th century ophthalmic tech-
niques see Fiona Roman, “Notes from Ophthalmic Practice in the Eighteenth Century,” 
British Journal of Ophthalmology 78.5 (1994): 338.
123 Ibid.
124 A description of an illustration of the technique reads: “c is a Sort of needle with an 
Edge on one Side which being pass’d thro’ the Tunica Sclerotis, is then brought forward 
thro’ the iris a little farther than e. This done, I turn the Edge of the need and cut thro’ the 
Iris as I draw it out,” quoted in ibid.
125 Leo Zimmerman and Ilza Veith, Great Ideas in the History of Surgery (San Fransisco: 
Norman Publishing, 1993), 297.
126 Ibid., 299.
127 This perception can also be seen through the enduring popularity of Cheselden’s The 
Anatomy of the Human Body, first published in 1713. On Cheselden’s role as a “public anato-
mist” see Anita Guerrini, “Anatomists and Entrepreneurs in Early Eighteenth-Century 
London,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 59.2 (2004).
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an investigation into whether such a person would be able to 
recognize objects by sight that she or he had previously only 
had access to through other senses: “The blind man’s arrival 
is a mythical as well as epistemological event, for if he brings 
with him no understanding of the visible, then philosophy 
has a new myth, that of its own totally experiential origin.”128 
However, by paying close attention to the rhetorical strategies 
of Cheselden’s own written accounts of the boy’s cure, it will 
be seen that the doctor not only increased the ability of “see-
ing” both by and of the body but he also opened new way of 
being able to see “not-seeing” itself, putting his interest in line 
with much contemporary thought on questions of blinking 
and vision, as can be seen in W. G. Sebald, Hélène Cixous and 
Jacques Derrida, discussed below. This is not to say that Che-
selden participates in a denigration of vision, although this too 
has a long and valuable history. Instead what is being argued 
here is that an emerging perception of darkness is concomitant 
with an emerging power of sight. This doubled perception is 
brought forth in a foregrounding of the temporal duration of 
the moment; that of both insight and obscurity, thus forming 
a figure of a “pure perception” of double-vision. 
Cheselden reports on his celebrated case of the reparation 
of sight to the boy born blind in a section of his Anatomy of 
the Human Body entitled “An account of observations made 
by a young gentleman who was born blind, or lost his sight 
so early, that he had no remembrance of ever having seen, 
128 William Paulson, Enlightenment, Romanticism, and the Blind in France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), 11.
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and was couch’d between thirteen and fourteen years of age.”129 
Cheselden’s account has secured a place in history because it 
was the earliest evidence available which addressed what was 
at first considered to be merely a thought-problem raised by 
the Irish lawyer William Molyneux, who posed his question 
to John Locke thus: will someone who is blind from birth be 
able to distinguish objects immediately upon gaining sight? 
Or put another way, “does the mind know before sense ex-
perience and if not, does each sense contribute a separate 
knowledge, which then has somehow to be coordinated into 
a unified sense of the world?”130 While there is not the space 
to rehearse or examine the “enormous thicket”131 of thought 
that surrounds Molyneux’s question, which starts with Locke 
and Diderot and continues in Berkeley, Condillac, Voltaire and 
beyond,132 a brief analysis of Cheselden’s original report will 
show how blindness and sight form a coupled figure. However, 
in order to frame the context of the importance of Cheselden’s 
work, Molyneux’s original problem should be quoted:
Suppose a Man born blind, and now adult, and taught by 
his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of 
the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to 
tell, when he felt one and t’other, which is the Cube, which 
129 William Cheselden, The Anatomy of the Human Body, 5th ed. (London: William Bow-
yer, 1740), 300. Orthography has been modernized when necessary when quoting from 
this text.
130 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 98.
131 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 340n4.
132 Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: mit Press, 1992), 59.
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the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and the Sphere placed 
on a table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quære, 
Whether by his sight, before he touch’d them, he could now 
distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube.133
As stated above, Molyneux’s question was treated as mere the-
ory until Cheselden’s invention provided the first case study, 
which was taken up, for example, by Voltaire (following Locke 
and Berkeley), who claimed that the study provided an answer 
of “no,” and by Thomas Reid, who claimed it at least evidenced 
a qualified “yes.”134 However, what is of interest here is not so 
much the details of the debate but rather the way in which it 
was taken up as a case study, as “hard evidence” at the begin-
ning of the Enlightenment. Perhaps one of the most prominent 
uses of Cheselden’s experiment is Immanuel Kant’s citation 
in his preface to the 1788 Critique of Practical Reason, where 
the philosopher makes a passing reference to Cheselden, say-
ing that “One might ask, like Cheselden’s blind man, ‘Which 
133 Quoted in John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 146. Molyneux had posed the question in a slightly 
different manner six years earlier, but received no response. Locke took up the issue in his 
second edition of the Essay. On the Molyneux question see Michael Morgan, Molyneux’s 
Question: Touch and the Philosophy of Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977) and Marjolein Degenaar, Molyneux’s Problem: Three Centures of Discussion on the 
Perception of Forms (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
134 In the Eléments de la philosophie de Newton Voltaire states that “[Cheselden’s] experi-
ment confirmed everything that Locke and Barclay had foreseen so well. For a long time 
the boy distinguished not size, situation, or even figure. An object measuring an inch, and 
put in front of his eye, and which hid a house from him, appeared to him as large as that 
house. All that he initially saw seemed him to be on his eyes, touching as the tactile objects 
touch the skin,” (Osterwald: Société Typographique de Neuchâtel, 1772), 178–9 (My transla-
tion). Cheselden attended Newton during the latter’s final illness. On Reid’s complex reac-
tion to the question, which includes a brief overview of the thought surrounding this issue, 
see James van Cleve, “Reid’s Answer to Molyneux’s Question,” The Monist 90.2 (2007).
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deceives me, sight or touch?’ (Empiricism is based on touch, 
but rationalism on a necessity which can be seen).”135 What is 
important for Kant is not actually the answer to the blind man’s 
question but rather the way in which Cheselden’s experiment 
illustrates the new approximation of science to the universality 
of a law. However, a closer examination of Cheselden’s report 
of the experiment will show that tagging along with this new-
found vision is an increased ability to make the ambiguity of 
darkness visible.
This making-darkness-visible can be seen in the way Che-
selden’s report of the young boy’s coming-to-sight is ground-
ed in ambiguity. Cheselden begins his account by saying that 
those like the boy he cured were not exactly totally blind: “they 
are never so blind from that cause [cataracts] but that they can 
discern day from night, and for the most part in a strong light, 
distinguish black, white, and scarlet.”136 Cheselden does not in 
any way try to “hide” such an ambiguous beginning but rather 
foregrounds it in this first sentence of his case study. He then 
goes on to describe other ways blind people can see, making 
a comparison of how “they can discern in no other manner, 
than a sound eye can through a glass of broken jelly, where a 
great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light, that the 
several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye 
135 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1956), 14.
136 Cheselden, The Anatomy of the Human Body, 300. Later, the boy said that scarlet was 
his favorite of colors, and that the extreme of black caused him fear, a fear which is perhaps 
more complex than Cheselden allows since it erupted when “some months after [the opera-
tion], feeling by accident a negro woman, he was struck with great horror at the sight,” 
ibid., 301.
145
into their proper foci.”137 Cheselden’s step forward for the En-
lightenment is already grounded in murky waters. Blindness 
and sight are not diametrically opposed for Cheselden, who 
begins his description of blindness with a description of sight. 
In other words, this great leap forward in visibility in both a 
literal sense of vision for the boy and in a scientific method 
which penetrates nature and the cosmos contains within itself 
its own dismantling, its own blindness, which is not a contem-
porary idea or interpretation but rather something that was 
foregrounded at its origins. 
However, Cheselden argues, despite the doubling of sight 
and blindness, these faint hints at vision were not enough to 
allow the boy to name objects that, post-op, now came into fo-
cus: “And thus it was with this young gentleman, who though 
he knew these colours asunder in a good light, yet when he 
saw them after he was couch’d, the faint ideas he had of them 
before, were not sufficient for him to know them by afterwards, 
and therefore he did not think them the same which he had 
before known by those names.”138 Even within this “no” to what 
became known as the Molyneux question, however, Cheselden 
reports a future which locates sight within blindness, and vice 
versa. This can be seen in the future appellation the boy assigns 
to a cat: “Having often forgot which was the cat, and which 
the dog, he was asham’d to ask; but catching the cat, which he 
knew by feeling, he was observed to look at her stedfastly, and 




time.”139 In this example the boy, filtered through Cheselden’s 
reportage, both knows and does not know the cat; he is able 
to apply a term to the cat: “puss,” although “puss” seems to 
be used as a placeholder until the more “correct” term “cat” 
can be found. “Puss” in this context makes a darkness visible 
by being a vocalized but “incorrect” stop-gap which allows 
the “darkness” of the inability to name the cat to come forth 
and be unveiled. “Puss” makes the inability of “cat” visible by 
putting off the “correct” naming to another time. In another 
example, blindness itself has its advantages, which do not dis-
appear when sight is gained: “And even blindness, he observed, 
had this advantage, that he could go any where in the dark, 
much better than those who can see; and after he had seen, he 
did not soon lose this quality, nor desire a light to go about the 
house in the night.”140 Cheselden’s boy concomitantly serves as 
a figure of great advances in the field of ophthalmic technique 
and in a sheltering of the powers of blindness from within the 
ramifications of that very event. 
7
vision vs knowledge. In one sense it seems like Che-
selden’s account functions in a different manner than an ear-
lier and very well-known example of anatomical blindness, 
Rembrandt’s The Anatomy Lecture of Dr Nicolaes Tulp of 1632. 
Rembrandt’s painting, created a century before Cheselden’s 
invention, depicts members of the Amsterdam Guild of Sur-
139 Cheselden, The Anatomy of the Human Body, 302.
140 Ibid., 303.
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geons around a body laid out on a dissecting table. However, 
the surgeons are looking over and past the body of criminal 
Aris Kindt in order to focus on an anatomy book propped up 
in a corner. The inability of the surgeons to see what is just 
below their eyes manifests itself in the cadaver’s left hand not 
only being wildly out of proportion to the rest of the body 
but also by its being erroneously replaced with a right hand. 
In addition, the shadow cast by the attending surgeons lies 
directly over the cadaver’s eyes, which are the only pair not 
focused on the text, instead turned up back into their eyelids. 
So while this image does illustrate the blindness of anatomy 
books, a blindness Cheselden’s contribution helped to dimin-
ish, the image may also be read as a determinate negation of 
the dialectics of Cheselden’s view, in that through a negative 
illustration of the effects of blindness, or of a blind following of 
erroneous anatomical texts, blindness itself is able to become 
more visible rather than any kind of sight being found “within” 
blindness. However, as Jonathan Crary argues in Techniques 
of the Observer, both versions of seeing blindness are still fil-
tered through language, rather than the sensual (in the sense of 
Harman). As Crary argues: In all the speculation surrounding 
the 1728 case of the Cheselden boy, no one was ever to sug-
gest that a blind person restored to sight would initially see a 
luminous and somehow self-sufficient revelation of colored 
patches. Instead, that inaugural moment of vision was a void 
that could not be spoken or represented, because it was empty 
of discourse and thus of meaning. Vision for the newly sighted 
person took shape when words, uses, and locations could be 
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assigned to objects.”141 This linguistic distance from the sensual 
finds its counterpart in the technique used by Cheselden to 
observe the elements of the body for his anatomy: the camera 
obscura. 
For Crary, the camera obscura, through all the different fluctu-
ations in the contexts of its use, imposes a fixed subject in rela-
tion to what is being observed (as can be seen in the observers’s 
literally sitting in a chair from Cheselden’s illustration). Thus, 
the “regularity and uniformity”142 which Crary sees as a part of 
the apparatus of the camera obscura represents its social func-
tion which is at a remove from the wildly sensual. In a similar 
manner Siegfried Zielinski argues that like early computers, 
the camera obscura was used and enjoyed but there was no 
access to its mode of funtioning.143 
141 Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 66.
142 Ibid., 30.
143 Siegfried Zielinski, Deep Time of the Media: Toward and Archaeology of Hearing and 
Seeing by Technical Means, trans. Gloria Custance (Cambridge & London: mit Press, 
2006), 259.
Image found on the title page of Cheselden’s The Anatomy of the Human Body.
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However, others have seen more of a rupture within these 
18th-century examples themselves. The use of Rembrandt’s im-
age as a visible placeholder for blindness can be found in a con-
temporary appropriation of the painting in W. G. Sebald’s 1995 
novel The Rings of Saturn. In this novel, which is full of images 
(as in all of Sebald’s fiction), Rembrandt’s work is reproduced 
twice: first in toto, and then only a detail of the cadaver ap-
pears. Sebald’s narrator tells us that “the anatomy lessons given 
every year in the depth of winter by Dr Nicolaas Tulp were not 
only of the greatest interest to a student of medicine but con-
stituted in addition a significant date in the agenda of a society 
that saw itself as emerging from the darkness into the light.”144 
Actually, Sebald describes how when viewing Rembrandt’s pic-
ture at the Mauritshuis in The Hague the spectator is put in the 
position of another one of the anatomists standing around the 
table on which the body of the criminal lies, although what 
changes in the observers’ perspective is that the blindness of 
the surgeons becomes the focus of the picture. Thus, the paint-
ing acts in a different manner than the camera obscura in that 
the position of the subject is unstable: “and we believe that we 
saw what they saw then: in the foreground, the greenish, prone 
body of Aris Kindt, his neck broken and his chest risen terribly 
in rigor mortis. And yet it is debatable whether anyone ever re-
ally saw that body, since the art of anatomy, then in its infancy, 
was not least a way of making the reprobate body invisible.”145 
144 W. G. Sebald, The Rings of Saturn, trans. Michael Hulse (London: The Harvill Press, 
1999), 12.
145 Ibid., 13. As Jonathan Long argues, “Sebald’s reading of the Anatomy Lesson shows 
that Rembrandt deploys the anatomical atlas against itself: by copying the lower left arm 
directly from the atlas, Rembrandt has painted it upside-down. The resulting ‘crass misrep-
resentation’ […] becomes, in the narrator’s view, a sign of the violence perpetrated on Aris 
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As such this scene is actually a foregrounding of an improved 
ability to make blindness visible: “Though the body is open 
to contemplation, it is, in a sense, excluded, and in the same 
way the much-admired verisimilitude of Rembrandt’s picture 
proves on closer examination to be more apparent than real”146 
which is revealed in the flipped-over and out-of-proportion 
hand of Kindt. Thus, the painting not only shows an anamor-
phosis regarding the observer, but also replaces the hegemony 
of vision-as-knowledge with the sensory apparatus of the body 
as a whole. This interpretation of Rembrandt’s painting then 
becomes a commentary on the role of images throughout Se-
bald’s work, for they function not as empirical proof of the I-
was-there but rather as elements foregrounding the darkness 
that is a part of vision itself. These images actually disrupt the 
connection between observation and truth by becoming up-
rooted from their role as evidence in order to show their lit-
erary function as truth-makers. While it is true that, as Mary 
Cosgrove argues, “Sebald reads this from an ethical perspec-
tive as Rembrandt’s empathy with criminal, Aris Kindt: Rem-
brandt is defying the growing Cartesian rationality of the sev-
enteenth century by asserting the body in this way”147 the story 
is making another point simultaneously, for “the narrator is 
equally making a point about the relationship between seeing 
Kindt and a gesture of empathic identification on the part of the painter. This stress on the 
suffering of the individual victim reinscribes embodiment at the very moment of its disap-
pearance into the body,” W. G. Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 135.
146 Sebald, Rings of Saturn, 16.
147 Mary Cosgrove, “Sebald for Our Time: The Politics of Melancholy and the Critique of 
Capitalism in his Work,” in W. G. Sebald and the Writing of History, eds. Anne Fuchs and 
Jonathan Long (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007), 107.
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and knowing”148 much as Molyneux’s question did, although 
Sebald’s reading is closer to Cheselden, who foregrounds the 
disruption of both sides of the argument rather than the em-
pirical certitude of the test.
But how can blindness be seen as such? Paul de Man has 
done much to map a territory of reading blindness. For exam-
ple, De Man asks how the ability for a sheltering of aporia can 
come about to be understood: “One should ask how a blind-
ness comes into being that allows for a statement in which 
truth and falsehood are completely subverted to be accepted 
as true without resistance.”149 Briefly, for De Man moments 
of blindness occur when insight slips through unnoticed by 
a writer. As he says in a discussion of Blanchot and Poulet, 
“their language could grope toward a certain degree of insight 
only because their method remained oblivious to the per-
ception of that insight. The insight exists only for a reader in 
the privileged position of being able to observe the blindness 
as a phenomenon in its own right – the question of his own 
blindness being one which he is by definition incompetent to 
ask – and so being able to distinguish between statement and 
meaning.”150 De Man describes here not only the blindness of 
Cheselden’s account of the boy, sometimes read as a “no” to 
Molyneux’s question but which actually grounded the ques-
tion in ambiguity, but also in the blindness of the surgeons 
of The Anatomy Lesson which can only be observed from the 
148 Ibid.
149 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and 
Proust (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1979), 62.
150 Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 106.
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literal and metaphorical position of the spectator in front of 
the canvas. These moments of blindness, however, “are also 
the moments at which they [critics, in this case] achieve their 
greatest insight.”151
De Man’s logic of blindness can also be found in a more 
contemporary example of technical advances in removing my-
opia, especially when found in the form of cataracts, which 
foregrounds to an even more qualitative extent an increased 
visibility of blindness. This example can be found in Hélène 
Cixous’ account of the removal of her myopia through laser 
surgery in Veils, written in conjunction with Jacques Derrida. 
In this work Cixous describes how it was only after the veil of 
myopia was removed that the blindness of the human condi-
tion came forth, much as it was with Cheselden and Rem-
brandt that there was a struggle with how only after the body 
started to be known that a thought of the phenomenologi-
cal allusiveness of that body could develop. Cixous opens her 
story, presumably speaking of herself in the third person, thus: 
“Myopia was her fault, her lead, her imperceptible native veil. 
Strange: she could see that she could not see, but she could 
not see clearly.”152 Similar to Cheselden’s boy, Cixous was blind 
but could see, or at least make somethings out: “Spectacles are 
feeble forks only just good enough to catch little bits of real-
ity. As the myopic people know, myopia has its shaky seat in 
judgment. It opens the reign of an eternal uncertainty that 
no prosthesis can dissipate.”153 However, advances in laser 
151 De Man, Blindness and Insight, 109.
152 Hélène Cixous & Jacques Derrida, Veils, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press, 2001), 3.
153 Ibid., 6.
153
eye surgery caused Cixous to have her myopia removed: “she 
had learned the incredible news: science had just vanquished 
the invincible. It was done in ten minutes. End of the infi-
nite. A possibility still impossible three years earlier. In the 
list of invincibles promised to defeat, they had just reached 
myopia.”154 In coordinates similar to Cheselden’s invention, a 
quick surgery offers the eradication of a hitherto unanswerable 
problem. However, the parallels do not end there, for it is only 
with the removal of the veil of myopia that Cixous is actually 
able to begin seeing myopia itself: “Such an experience could 
take place only once, that’s what was disturbing her. Myopia 
would not grow again, the foreigner would never come back to 
her, her myopia, so strong – a force that she had always called 
weakness and infirmity. But now its force, its strange force, was 
revealed to her, retrospectively at the very moment it was taken 
away from her.”155 Derrida, in his accompanying essay, draws 
forth the manner in which the removal of the veil is in fact a 
making-the-veil-visible: “You poor thing, you poor thing: fin-
ishing with the veil will always have been the very movement 
of the veil: un-veiling, unveiling oneself, reaffirming the veil in 
unveiling. It finishes with itself in unveiling, does the veil, and 
always with a view to finishing off in self-unveiling. Finishing 
with the veil is finishing with self. Is that what you’re hoping 
for from the verdict?”156
What the removal of the veil has shown is, retrospectively, 





out all of the examples in this essay is a foregrounding of the 
expanse of time between understanding and non-understand-
ing, between light and darkness, between vision and blind-
ness. In other words, of pure presence, which takes place in 
the duration of the blink. Or, as Derrida argues in Speech and 
Phenomena: “As soon as we admit this continuity of the now 
and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of 
primordiality common to primordial impression and primor-
dial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the 
Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into 
the blink of the instant. There is a duration to the blink, and it 
closes the eye.”157 Derrida is arguing for a knowledge or vision 
of how what is not ourselves is concomitant to a construction 
or what is ourselves. In this sense he describing the location 
of the Weavers in Perdido Street Station; in that they are both 
the combination of consciousness and forgetting, and their 
disruption in cognition. This doubled identity is made possible 
because of the exterior relationship of blindness (nonpercep-
tion) and sight (perception) rather than the manner in which 
one lies underneath the understanding of another.
157 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, 
trans. David Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 62.
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– and here reason, for one flicker of an 
eye, reached the Is. 
 – Augustine, Confessions
I learned: the first lesson of my life: no-
body can face the world with his eyes 
open all the time.
 – Salman Rushdie, Midnight’s Children
When we began, we attempted to open 
the dossier of seeing. Not just in the epis-
temological sense of what it means to see, 
or the hermeneutical sense of the meaning 
of what is seen but, more pertinently, the 
question what is seeing. 
And when we say we, one has to keep in 
mind the fact that this is a collaborative 
thinking; a thinking that was only pos-
sible as others – Julia Hölzl, Jessica Aliaga 
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Lavrijsen, Brian Willems – had responded 
to our call to think, to attend to this ges-
ture that had called out to us even as it 
continually escaped, continues to elude 
us. In this sense, even as we were send-
ing out the call, we were unsure of what 
we were calling out for, if there was even 
an object, let alone objective, to our call. 
Thus, this was a call that was not only 
open to possibilities, it was a call that was 
open to itself, did not pretend to under-
stand what it was calling for – an open call. 
Which means that even as we read the re-
sponses to our call, chose, compiled, and 
put together what we now call a book, our 
book, we have no way of knowing if we 
have managed to attend to the question 
we opened, the question that first called 
out to us. 
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a confession. Keeping in mind Augus-
tine’s warning that if one is truly seeking 
– calling out – one cannot first know what 
one is looking for; and thus, always runs 
the risk of not only not finding it, but of 
mistaking what one finds as what one was 
looking for.* We should not forget that 
Augustine’s text was written to the divine, 
to one that knows even as (S)he remains 
unknowable to us. Much like how the 
reader – you – remains veiled from us 
even as we attempt to address you. Thus, 
even as we write, you read, the relation-
ality between what is written and what is 
read is always already haunted by the pos-
sibility of blindness – perhaps even when 
the one who reads is the very one who 
has written. 
Saint Augustine, Confessions, 
trans. Gary Wills (London: 
Penguin Classics, 2006), 3–6. 
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This is particularly crucial as seeing – 
presence – has long been privileged in 
Western thought. But one must also re-
member that if discovery is finding whilst 
not knowing exactly what one is looking 
for, searching implies a certain blindness 
in seeing: and the moment of unveiling 
might well be one that is shrouded in 
darkness. At the instant of the encounter, 
one might not even know that one has 
encountered something. 
An encounter where one is never quite 
certain which sense has the first encoun-
ter – if the encounter even happens in the 
realm of the senses. 
And more importantly, that even whilst 
it is a figure that points to seeing, it is one 
that is unsure of what it sees: the very un-
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certainty of what is seen foregrounded in 
the speed in which the seeing takes place: 
so much so that oftentimes one has to 
have a second look to be sure; a review-
ing that might not avail of itself to one. So, 
even as there is something that affects one 
in that blink of an eye, one might never 
be certain of the cause of the effect – it 
might well be something that is not of the 
order of sight. 
Thus, opening the question of sight also 
opens the register of what it means to 
know. A question that the essays attempt 
to address by attending to various sites 
of knowledge – photography, literature, 
philosophy – not just to locate unknow-
abilities, but to respond to ways in which 
they affect us. Hence, even as this book 
attempts to think about seeing, to ques-
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tion what knowledge is, even as it unveils 
the blindness in knowing, seeing, it always 
also foregrounds its own lack of sight, ac-
knowledges the unknowability within its 
claims. Which suggests that even as the 
essays stake positions on – this book pos-
its – even as it sets forth notions to be 
seen, it brings with it what cannot be seen. 
And here, if we listen carefully, we can 
hear echoes of Cioran’s warning: “the 
terrifying experience of death, when 
preserved in consciousness, becomes ru-
inous. If you talk about death, you save 
part of your self. But at the same time, 
something of your real self dies, because 
objectified meanings lose the actuality 
they have in consciousness.” Perhaps then, 
all we can do is name the dash, to speak 
of the dash, whilst letting it be – whilst 
E.M. Cioran, On the 
Heights of Despair, 
trans. Ilinca Zarifopol-
Johnston, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 4.
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letting it dash, break, the very notion of 
meaning itself. 
Not as if Augustine himself did not realise 
this: “My reason, while recognizing its 
own mutability, concentrated on its own 
activity, abstracting its expression from 
old patterns, freeing itself from the blur 
of contradictory impressions, to trace the 
ripple of light by which it promptly ac-
knowledged that the immutable is above 
the mutable (how otherwise was it pre-
ferred to the mutable?) –” It is only by 
freeing his mind from itself – from its own 
cognisance of its transience and thus the 
impossibility of approaching the eternal 
– suspending reason insofar as it is pos-
sible, that Augustine, by no longer being 
himself – dashing himself – opens him-
self to the possibility of the “Is.” Where 
Augustine, Confessions, 153.
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the encounter with the divine is always in 
the “trace” – trail, remainder. And only in 
a moment – “for one flicker of an eye” – 
might it be glimpsed.
In a moment before reason. 
Thus, an encounter that lies outside one, 
beyond one’s capacity to know: one that 
affects us whilst being absent from our 
very senses. Which opens yet another 
question: how can one see absence? Per-
haps only with one’s eyes closing – not 
quite shut, but with eyelids dashing to-
wards each other. 
Not deliberately though: for that would 
still be of the order of reason, self-aware-
ness. Thus, not a wink. But a gesture that 
is both of the person but also one that es-
165
capes the full control of one, that happens 
to one – a blink.
“Nobody can face the world with his eyes 
open all the time”: not because there is too 
much to be seen and therefore one needs 
intermittent breaks, but because without a 
break in seeing, one can never open one-
self to the possibility of seeing what can-
not be seen – the remainder of sight, the 
outside of seeing, that is the immutable, 
the eternal.* And if this remainder is of 
the eternal – unchanging, 
ever-present, but always also 
potentially absent, escaping us, 
then perhaps all we can ever do 
is imagine it, envisage it even as 
we cannot see it, name it.
Sometimes, just a little out of 
sight. 
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